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<title>Europe&apos;s Journal of Psychology</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/" />
<modified>2008-03-17T20:51:41Z</modified>
<tagline></tagline>
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<copyright>Copyright (c) 2008, andreea</copyright>
<entry>
<title>Attachment in Early Childhood </title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/archives/2008/02/attachment_in_e.html" />
<modified>2008-03-17T20:51:41Z</modified>
<issued>2008-02-25T20:06:41Z</issued>
<id>tag:www.ejop.org,2008://1.156</id>
<created>2008-02-25T20:06:41Z</created>
<summary type="text/plain">

Attachment describes a tendency for human infants to seek comfort, support, nurturance and protection from one or more discriminated caregivers.  The tendency for selective seeking of comfort is not apparent at birth, however.  Following a period of sociability and comfort with a wide range of adult caregivers during the first 6 months, at about 7 to 9 months of age, two new infant behaviors appear, stranger wariness and separation protest.  </summary>
<author>
<name>andreea</name>

<email>psy.journal@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<dc:subject>Interview</dc:subject>
<content type="text/html" mode="escaped" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.ejop.org/">
<![CDATA[<p><strong>Interview with Prof. Charles Zeanah</strong><br />
<strong>Mihaela Chraif<br />
EJOP Editor</strong></p>

<p><img alt="czeanah1a.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/czeanah1a.jpg" width="170" height="200" /></p>

<p><br />
<strong>Charles H. Zeanah, Jr., M.D</strong>. is Sellars-Polchow Professor of Psychiatry and Professor of Clinical Pediatrics, Director of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Vice-Chair of the Department of Psychiatry and Neurology at the Tulane University School of Medicine.  Professor Zeanah serves as Executive Director of the Institute of Infant and Early Childhood Mental Health.  He also directs the Tulane/JPHSA Infant Team, a community-based intervention program for abused and neglected infants and toddlers in the New Orleans area.  He has a longstanding interest in Infant Mental Health, and his research and clinical interests concern the effects of exposure to violence on the development of young children, attachment and its development in high-risk environments, risk and protective factors in development, psychopathology in early childhood, and infant-parent relationships.  Professor Zeanah has published numerous scientific papers and book chapters on these topics.  He is the editor of the Handbook of Infant Mental Health, published by Guilford Press.  Prof. Zeanah serves as a member of the Council (Board) of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. </p>

<p></p>

<p><strong>What do attachment means?</strong></p>

<p>	<strong>Prof Zeanah: </strong><strong>Attachment</strong> describes a tendency for human infants to seek comfort, support, nurturance and protection from one or more discriminated caregivers.  The tendency for selective seeking of comfort is not apparent at birth, however.  Following a period of sociability and comfort with a wide range of adult caregivers during the first 6 months, at about 7 to 9 months of age, two new infant behaviors appear, stranger wariness and separation protest.  Stranger wariness describes an apparent discomfort with unfamiliar adults and a turning for comfort selectively to those they know and trust.  Separation protest refers to the infant’s new tendency to protest separation from familiar caregivers.  Although individual differences in the intensity and expression of these behaviours are clear, they may be considered virtually ubiquitous.  When these behaviors appear, the infant is said to be attached to one or more caregivers.<br />
  <br />
 <br />
<em><strong>EJOP</strong>: Professor Zeanah, can you tell us what are types of attachment?</em><br />
	<br />
<strong>Professor Zeanah</strong>: Types or patterns of attachment refer to individual differences in the way that a child’s attachment behaviors are organized towards a particular attachment figure.   These patterns are derived from classifications of the child’s behavior in a separation-reunion paradigm known as the Strange Situation Procedure.  When a child expresses distress about separation directly to the caregiver, seeks comfort from the attachment figure (but not from the stranger), and is soothed within a short period of time after separation, the child is said to have a secure attachment to that particular caregiver. </p>

<p> Children who have little or no distress and who ignore or actively avoid their attachment figures on reunion are classified as having avoidant attachments to the attachment figure.  Infants who become distressed on separation but who fail to soothe on reunion are classified as having resistant attachments.  Finally, children who have mixed patterns or who exhibit atypical behaviors in place of attachment behaviors have attachments classified as disorganized or as insecure/other..</p>

<p> <br />
 <br />
<em><strong>EJOP: </strong>What can you tell us about attachment classifications as risk and protective  factors?</em><br />
	<br />
<strong>Professor Zeanah: </strong>Especially within high risk samples of children, secure attachment appears to be an important protective factor.  Disorganized and insecure/other attachments, on the other hand, appear to bsignificantly increase the risk that a child will exhibit psychopathology, either concurrently or subsequently.</p>

<p> <br />
<em><strong>EJOP:</strong> What are disorders of attachment?</em><br />
	<br />
<em><strong>Professor Zeanah</strong>:</em> In extreme rearing conditions, however, such as social neglect or institutional care, attachment may be seriously compromised or even absent.  Reactive attachment disorder (RAD) describes a constellation of aberrant attachment behaviors and other social behavioral anomalies that are believed to result from social neglect and deprivation.  Two clinical patterns have been described: (a) an emotionally withdrawn/inhibited pattern, in which the child exhibits limited or absent initiation or response to social interactions with caregivers, and a variety of aberrant social behaviors, such as inhibited, hypervigilant, or highly ambivalent reactions, and (b) an indiscriminately social/disinhibited pattern, in which the child exhibits lack of expectable selectivity in seeking comfort, support and nurturance, with lack of social reticence with unfamiliar adults and a willingness to “go off” with strangers.</p>

<p>	Although systematic study of attachment disorders is quite recent, these disorders have been described in young deprived children for more than half a century.  From recent studies, it seems clear that signs of  attachment disorders are rare to non-existent in low risk samples, increased in higher risk samples, and readily identifiable in maltreated and institutionalized samples.  Recent research has demonstrated that these disorders often remit when caregiving conditions improve, though with variability for each type  <br />
Interestingly, the emotionally withdrawn/inhibited type of RAD is readily apparent in young children living in institutions and in young children when they are first placed in foster care following maltreatment, but it is rarely evident in samples of children adopted out of institutions.  Further, in a randomized controlled trial in which children in institutions were randomized to continued care in institutions or to foster placements, the children in foster care demonstrated dramatic decreases in signs of emotionally withdrawn/inhibited RAD within months and became indistinguishable from levels of never institutionalized children.  This suggests that the emotionally withdrawn/inhibited type is quickly responsive to improvements in the caregiving environment.</p>

<p>	The indiscriminately social/disinhibited type of RAD, also is discernable in maltreated and institutionalized children, but it remains evident in a substantial minority of adopted post-institutionalized children.   In fact, continued high levels of indiscriminate behavior is one of the most frequent social abnormalities in children adopted out of institutions, continuing in some cases for years following adoption.  Further, in the study of children placed into foster care following institutionalization, levels of indiscriminately social/disinhibited RAD diminished, but the levels did not reach those of never institutionalized children, even two years later.</p>

<p><em><strong>EJOP:</strong> What have you learned about attachment in the Bucharest Early Intervention Project?</em>	</p>

<p><strong>Professor Zeanah: </strong>First, we learned that young children living in institutions are at substantially increased risk for disturbed attachments.  That is, they were less likely to be securely attached, more likely to have disorganized or unclassifiable atachments, more likely to have incompletely developed attachments, and more likely to exhibit signs of attachment disorders, both the emotionally withdrawn/inhibited type and the indiscriminately social/disinhibited type. </p>

<p>	Second we learned that removal from institutions and placement on foster care significantly increased the number of children who had secure attachments to their caregivers, as well as reduced the number of children who exhibited disorganized or insecure/other patterns of attachment.</p>

<p>	Finally, we learned that children placed in foster care at younger ages were more likely to exhibit both secure and organized attachments.  Although there is unlikely to be an age at which secure attachment can no longer develop, our data suggest that the younger the child, the more likely a secure attachment will develop following placement in foster care.</p>

<p>http://www.infantinstitute.com/faculty.htm  </p>]]>

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>On the media examination of the mental health of political figures</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/archives/2008/02/on_the_media_ex.html" />
<modified>2008-03-03T07:29:52Z</modified>
<issued>2008-02-24T07:17:56Z</issued>
<id>tag:www.ejop.org,2008://1.155</id>
<created>2008-02-24T07:17:56Z</created>
<summary type="text/plain">Wouldn’t it be great if we could identify and help people at risk of serious mental health problems before the onset of illness?  In fact the British Medical Journal  has reported on President George W Bush’s proposal to screen the American population for mental illness (Lenzer, 2004).</summary>
<author>
<name>andreea</name>

<email>psy.journal@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<dc:subject>Editorial</dc:subject>
<content type="text/html" mode="escaped" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.ejop.org/">
<![CDATA[<p><strong>By John Barry,<br />
City University</strong></p>

<p><br />
Wouldn’t it be great if we could identify and help people at risk of serious mental health problems before the onset of illness?  In fact the British Medical Journal  has reported on President George W Bush’s proposal to screen the American population for mental illness (Lenzer, 2004). There are obvious pros and cons to this sort of programme - people of the former USSR will no doubt have fears regarding civil liberties - but it has occurred to me that perhaps the President of the US himself might not be given a clean bill of health, if the claims about his mental health are to be believed. </p>

<p>In the past few years there have been suggestions that George W Bush might not be the epitome of psychological health, and for critics of Bush there is a certain appeal to such claims.  During the 1980’s Britain’s Channel 4 television station broadcast Spitting Image, a politically satirical puppet show, that included a storyline called ‘The President’s Brain is Missing’, in which Ronald Reagan’s brain had escaped from his body and was on the run in America (Spitting Image, 1984 –1996). According to the plot Reagan’s body continued through the motions of government, but in a predictably ‘brainless’ fashion. This story was very popular with the British public at that time, though our subsequent knowledge of Reagan’s dementia puts the story in a less comic light. </p>

<p>In recent years some mental health professionals have suggested that there are subtle but worrying signs in the words and behaviour of the current President of the US, George W. Bush.  The concerns are various, but the first to receive public attention was the claim that Bush’s words and actions are reminiscent of those of people who are suffering from what known in Alcoholics Anonymous circles as ‘dry drunk syndrome’. This observation was first made by political journalist Alan Bisport (2002).  Bisport suggested that although Bush had ended 20 years of heavy drinking in 1986 after being “rescued by God” (Bisport 2002, para.5), alcoholism had left Bush with permanent cognitive limitations. Professor of Social Work and author on addiction treatment Karen van Wormer amplified this view, asserting that the pattern of thinking shown by Bush is often identified in recovering alcoholics attending Alcoholics Anonymous or substance abuse counselling.  The ‘dry drunk’ is someone who exhibits the following symptoms: <br />
•	Exaggerated self-importance and pomposity <br />
•	Grandiose behavior <br />
•	A rigid, judgmental outlook <br />
•	Impatience <br />
•	Childish behavior <br />
•	Irresponsible behavior <br />
•	Irrational rationalization <br />
•	Projection <br />
•	Overreaction <br />
van Wormer suggests that Bush exhibits all of these traits apart from the first (being the President of the most powerful country in the world leaves little room for the exaggeration of your importance!).   She cites several examples from his speeches to illustrate. For example, regarding his rigid & judgmental outlook, she cites his comments regarding attacks against Israel: "…look my job isn't to try to nuance. I think moral clarity is important... this is evil versus good" (ITV, 2002).  van Wormer gives an illustration of the trait of impatience shown by Bush regarding needing proof of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction before war was waged: “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long" (Office of the Press Secretary 2002, para 18).  Erosions of freedom of speech under the Bush administration (Reilly, 2004) probably straddle several of the above symptoms, but as we know science does not progress simply by searching out instances supporting our hypotheses, but by instances that contradict our hypotheses. If we are to ‘diagnose’ Bush on the basis of interviews and speeches we need only one instance of a time when he has shown patience or an ability for being flexible & non-judgemental for the entire ‘diagnosis’ to require reassessment. <br />
 <br />
However, another explanation is that the rigidity of thinking etc are simply part of the conservative mindset, a mindset shared with Bush by all who voted for him. In their meta-analysis of 88 samples from a wide range of sources (including experimental studies, surveys, and statements by politicians), Jost et al. (2003) found that political conservatism is related to several psychological variables including: death anxiety (r = .5); system instability (r = .47); dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity (r = .34); openness to experience (r = –.32); uncertainty tolerance (r = –.27); and needs for order, structure, and closure (.26).  They give an example of dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity from George W Bush: "I know what I believe and I believe what I believe is right" (Sanger, 2001, cited in Jost et al. 2003, p.353).  However, such traits are not necessarily fixed, and can be influenced by events. Regarding ‘death anxiety’: “High profile terrorist attacks such as those of September 11, 2001, might simultaneously increase the cognitive accessibility of death and the appeal of political conservatism” (Jost et al. 2003, p.364). This might go some way to explaining the appeal of conservatism to US voters, and could imply that – ironically – the more salient death is made as a result of the backlash against US conservative foreign policy, the more likely voters are likely to be frightened into supporting the very policies that have provoked such dangers.  Jost et al’s work implies that people are politically conservative for different reasons, perhaps some due to nature and others due to nurture, so even if Bush were suffering from an organic cognitive impairment his condition might be ameliorated by his environment. Is everyone who voted for Bush a dry drunk? Obviously not, despite the fact that they may share similarities in cognitive style. </p>

<p>Another attack on Bush’s mental credibility comes from Justin Frank, Director of Psychiatry at George Washington University. In his book Bush on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President he agrees with Bisport’s and van Wormer’s view that alcoholism may have left Bush with a tendency to black & white thinking, but Franks goes much further. Using the technique of ‘applied psychoanalysis’ to assess Bush (without ever actually meeting him) the picture Frank paints of a young  boy scarred by the death of his younger sister seems only tangentially relevant to the actions of George W Bush, the adult and President. Frank’s method of assessment has been used by the CIA to profile foreign leaders though autobiographical sketches, and clearly falls short of the DSM in terms of diagnostic validity. <br />
 <br />
In conclusion, why do we need to argue that someone whose opinions and actions are ones we disapprove of is necessarily insane? Other leaders have had drug or alcohol problems (e.g. J.F. Kennedy) or mental health issues (e.g. Winston Churchill) and this has not stopped them from being great leaders.  The tendency to pathologise everyday behaviour is an impulse we need to curb; sometimes a excitable and energetic child is just that, and not a case of ADHD in need of urgent treatment. As for Bush, perhaps in the end it is just more comfortable to think that his behaviour couldn’t be that of someone sane, as it implies that we all might behave in that way if they were in the same situation. </p>

<p>It is obvious that attempting diagnosis without having direct access to the patient has its limitations and dangers. On the other hand, while we were laughing at Spitting Image’s portrayal of a bumbling and forgetful Reagan in the 80’s, little did we realise that these public gaffs were likely to have been the early signs of Alzheimer's.   But in the end, mental illness is no laughing matter, nor a matter for political point-scoring.</p>

<p></p>

<p>References:</p>

<p>Altman, L.K. (2004, June 15). The Doctor’s World; A Recollection of Early Questions About Reagan's Health. New York Times. Retrieved Oct 10, from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0DE5D61030F936A25755C0A9629C8B63&sec=health&pagewanted=print<br />
Bisport, A. (2002, 24th Sept). Dry Drunk: Is Bush making a cry for help? American Politics Journal. Retrieved Oct 8, from http://www.americanpolitics.com/20020924Bisbort.html</p>

<p>Frank, J.A. (2004).  Bush on the Couch: Inside the Mind of the President.  New York: HarperCollins.</p>

<p>Goldenberg, S. (2004, June 11). The Guardian Profile: Nancy Reagan. Retrieved Oct  9 from http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1236101,00.html</p>

<p>Hallmark, C.L. (2004). Photos Show George W. Bush Seriously Ill Physically. Houston Independent Media Centre, Dec 21st. Retrieved Oct 8, from http://houston.indymedia.org/news/2004/12/35839.php<br />
ITV (2002, 4th April), Tonight with Trevor McDonald. Retrieved Oct 8, from  http://www.usembassy.it/file2002_04/alia/a2040709.htm<br />
Jost, J.T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A.W., and Sulloway, F.J. (2003). Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 3, 339-375. Retrieved Oct 8, from<br />
http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org/resources_files/ConsevatismAsMotivatedSocialCognition.pdf#search=%22glaser%20Kruglanski%22</p>

<p>Lenzer, J. (2004). Bush plans to screen whole US population for mental illness. BMJ, 328: 1458. Retrieved Oct 8, from http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/328/7454/1458?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=1&title=bush+to+screen&andorexacttitle=and&andorexacttitleabs=and&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&resourcetype=HWCIT</p>

<p>MacAskill, E. (2005, Oct 7). George Bush: God told me to end the tyranny in Iraq. Retrieved Oct 9, from http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1586978,00.html</p>

<p>Office of the Press Secretary (2002). President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, June 1st 2002. Retrieved Oct 8, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html</p>

<p>Reilly, W. (2004, May 27). Free speech zones in the USA?  Baltimore Chronicle. Retrieved Oct 8, from http://baltimorechronicle.com/052704FreeSpeechZones.shtml</p>

<p>Sanger, D. E. (2001, July 25). On world stage, America’s president wins<br />
mixed reviews. The New York Times, p. A1.<br />
van Wormer, K. (2002). Addiction, Brain Damage and the President. "Dry Drunk" Syndrome and George W. Bush. Retrieved Oct 8, from http://www.counterpunch.org/wormer1011.html<br />
Spitting Image (1984 -1996). In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved Oct 9, 2006, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spitting_Image</p>

<p>NOTE: The editorial expresses the opinion of the author and does not represent the views of the Editorial Team. <br />
</p>]]>

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>13th International Congress Bridging the Gaps, Integrating Perspectives in Child and Adolescent Mental Health: August 2007, Florence</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/archives/2008/02/13th_internatio.html" />
<modified>2008-02-24T20:27:06Z</modified>
<issued>2008-02-21T20:16:19Z</issued>
<id>tag:www.ejop.org,2008://1.154</id>
<created>2008-02-21T20:16:19Z</created>
<summary type="text/plain">

The 13th International Congress of the European Society for Child and Adolescent Psychology occasioned a series of discussions and presentations on the most recent and important developments in the field of Child and Adolescent Psychology as it heads towards a new scientific and cultural approach for European Child and Adolescent Mental Health. The Congress Venue was Palazzo dei Congressi and Palazzo degli Affari, Florence, Italy.</summary>
<author>
<name>andreea</name>

<email>psy.journal@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<dc:subject>Global PsyPulse</dc:subject>
<content type="text/html" mode="escaped" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.ejop.org/">
<![CDATA[<p><img alt="fl1.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/fl1.jpg" width="450" height="54" /></p>

<p><br />
<strong>Psychologist Ana Maria Pap<br />
University of Bucharest</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p><br />
The 13th International Congress of the European Society for Child and Adolescent Psychology occasioned a series of discussions and presentations on the most recent and important developments in the field of Child and Adolescent Psychology as it heads towards a new scientific and cultural approach for European Child and Adolescent Mental Health. The Congress Venue was Palazzo dei Congressi and Palazzo degli Affari, Florence, Italy.</p>

<p><br />
<img alt="forenta1.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/forenta1.jpg" width="447" height="336" /><br />
Photo 1. Palazzo degli Affari, Florence.</p>

<p><br />
This ESCAP Congress has been created by the work of each participant, clinician or researcher, working in the field of the welfare and mental health of children and adolescents. “Each of them” – states the Congress President, Prof. Ernesto Caffo – “has a genuine interest in developing a contemporary and appropriate culture for children, focused on the individual rights and environmental needs of each child”. The Congress program was sensitive to the fact that the developmental periods of childhood and adolescence represent a crucial time for early diagnostic evaluations and the implementation of effective actions. At the same, having in mind that the new knowledge and the collective experience of each participant will offer extraordinary opportunities for prevention. </p>

<p>The aim of the conference was to “bridge” widely disparate knowledge and disciplines by sharing models and developing integrated perspectives. Perhaps, the most demanding challenge was to bridge the gaps between mind and body and between differing approaches and professions, to arrive at a common pathway for research and clinical practice. </p>

<p>At this event participated 2.500 delegates from 84 countries and all the continents. In total, there were around 200 sessions, including 35 State of  Art Lectures, 60 Symposiums, 30 “Meet the Expert” and more... The Main Lectures had a strong scientific focus, being mainly theoretical and research-oriented, delivered by leading psychologists, basic scientists or other mental health professionals invited by the Scientific Committee. Also, there were State of the Art Lectures, that presented the most recent developments in a certain areas. Here are some of the lectures presented: Learning and Memory; The Impact of Child Trauma on Adult Development; Psychosomatic Disorders in Children and Adolescents; Who, Role and Responsibilities Related to Children and Families; Suicide; Substance Use and Abuse – New Developments in Research and Interventions; Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Past, Present and Future; Ethics.</p>

<p>The Symposium sessions focused on clinical issues and constituted the central element of the Congress. These high-quality symposia brought together people from different backgrounds and encouraged an active and enriching interaction between speakers and participants, being data-driven and presenting perspectives of different aspects of a topic or different views of the same topic. The themes presented were: Models of Attachment and Communicative Style in Early Mother-Child Relationship; Treatment of Urban and Delinquent Youth; Personality Disorders in Children and Adolescents; Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis: from Models to Clinics; Psychopathology in Language and Learning Disorders.</p>

<p><img alt="forenta2.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/forenta2.jpg" width="446" height="336" /><br />
Photo 2. Professor Caffo with Professor Bollea.</p>

<p>The Training Courses and Half-Day Courses were programs that provided a review of a topic area rather than new research information. They also focused on “how to do it” with respect to academic areas, clinical problems or a blending of the two. These didactic formats provided interaction and/or discussion between presenters and participants. Here are some examples: “The Value of Psychotherapy in Child Psychiatry: A Training Course in Psychotherapy”, Chaired By Professor Peter Fonagy (United Kingdom); “Understanding and Intervening with Children, Families and Communities Exposed to Trauma and Disaster”, Chaired By Dr. William Yule (United Kingdom) and Dr. Nathaniel Laor (Israel); “ADHD: Difficult Questions and Practical Answers”, Chaired By Professor Eric Taylor (United Kingdom), etc.<br />
The Debates were 120-minute events that included brief presentations lasting a total of more than sixty minutes, followed by a minimum of sixty minutes of broad interactive discussions with topics including important and controversial issues such as the specific roles of various professionals in mental health care and the role and prospects of special treatment. These includes themes such as: The Ethical Relationship Between Scientific Journals And Commercial Interest; Conflict of Interest.</p>

<p>Clinical Consultation Breakfasts on Autism; Genetics; ADHD; Trauma, etc. lasted for one-and-a-half hours and provide a forum for experts to share clinical knowledge and discuss difficult cases with attendees.</p>

<p>The Workshops dealt with topics of special interest to child and adolescent mental health, such as: Integrating Spirituality into the Model of Strengths Based Psychotherapy in Working with Traumatized Children; Research to Practice. Integrating Perspectives in Adolescent Prevention of Eating Disorders; School Integration as Community Care: The Italian Model; Working With Children in Systems of Care; Evidence Based Family Therapies for Behavior Disordered Adolescents in the Netherlands: First Results.</p>

<p>During the 120-minute Clinical Case Conferences, the presenter described a clinical case and discussed with the audience possible diagnoses and treatments. This format gave clinicians the opportunity to present difficult cases or new treatments, such as: The Adolescent and his Parent: A Community of Suffering Psychotherapeutical Perspectives.</p>

<p><br />
<img alt="forenta3.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/forenta3.jpg" width="447" height="336" /><br />
Photo 3. Auditorium, Palazzo Congressi. </p>

<p><br />
In the Meet the Expert sessions, a leading child and adolescent psychologist interacted freely with a group of generally younger and less experienced members of the same field. The session focused on the expert’s career, research interests and experience, as well as a on perspectives on future research. Facilitators of each session will be other experts in the field. </p>

<p>The Poster Presentation Sessions presented new research findings or important ongoing research. </p>

<p>At the Congress also participated the ERICE group (Empowerment and Resilience in Children Everywhere), an international collaborative project aimed at improving the lives of Israeli and Palestinian children. It includes Israeli, Palestinian, European and American child mental health professionals, and is supported by Foundation Child and Yale University and affiliated with a number of leading Israeli, Palestinian, Italian and American Universities.</p>

<p><br />
<img alt="forenta4.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/forenta4.jpg" width="448" height="335" /><br />
Photo 4. Prof Flora M Vaccarino, Child Study Center Yale University.</p>

<p>Founded in 2004, ERICE has many important goals including the support of research on the prevalence and nature of childhood disorders in this region of conflict, the implementation of treatment programs and the establishment of training and degree programs. It is guided by the belief that children everywhere are to be cherished and that protection of children - as well as kindness - is a shared human value. Since its first meeting in Jerusalem in 2004, this group continues to meet both in the region and in Europe. The last two Italian meetings were in Sicily (2005) and in Rome (2006), where the ongoing results from the first funded joint project were presented.<br />
Also the Child Helpline International (CHI) was present at the Congress as a global network of telephone helplines and outreach services for children and young people. Working in over 150 countries, CHI was founded on the belief that children and young people have rights, and that they alone are the best individuals to identify their problems.</p>

<p>As an organization devoted to securing children’s rights, CHI is committed to maintaining the spirit of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Its main concern is to respond to children in need of care and protection and voice their concerns to policy and decision-makers by establishing a global network of children’s helplines and providing support to individual helplines for children.<br />
During the ESCAP Congress CHI took part in the symposium “Helplines and Internet: innovative intervention in child and adolescent mental health.” This symposium was aimed at analyzing the role of helplines in the European countries and promoting the exchange of data and experiences, particularly regarding the issue of quality standards and professional skills.</p>

<p>In summary, the 13th ESCAP Congress was a wonderful opportunity to learn, to meet old friends and to know new colleagues. It was a superb celebration for Child and Adolescent Psychology in Europe that ended with the official “Declaration of Florence” – an essential position statement for the future of Mental Health of children, adolescents and their families in Europe.<br />
</p>]]>

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Experimental Psychology </title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/archives/2008/02/experimental_ps.html" />
<modified>2008-02-16T17:11:58Z</modified>
<issued>2008-02-15T22:30:15Z</issued>
<id>tag:www.ejop.org,2008://1.149</id>
<created>2008-02-15T22:30:15Z</created>
<summary type="text/plain">


The main goal of the book is to highlight that the research methods are the most enjoyable –and the easiest to learn- when you are actively involved and to teach the readers how to phrase questions scientifically, how to design and conduct scientific research and how to interpret and communicate the results. </summary>
<author>
<name>andreea</name>

<email>psy.journal@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<dc:subject>Book Reviews</dc:subject>
<content type="text/html" mode="escaped" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.ejop.org/">
<![CDATA[<p><strong>by Prof. Dr. Mihai Anitei</strong></p>

<p><img alt="ologie_experimentala_2.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/ologie_experimentala_2.jpg" width="150" height="230" /></p>

<p></p>

<p><br />
<strong>Reviewed by Mihaela Chraif<br />
Ejop Editor<br />
</strong></p>

<p>The scientist’s pursuit of curiosity follows unknown paths, sometimes resulting in unanticipated discoveries that can appear to be accidental. Excitement, vague suspicions and flashes of insight are very much part of science. Thus are hard work, procedures and rigorous thinking that put our ideas to many demanding tests. The laboratories, the equipment, the computer are tools to promote the scientists’ central activity-creative systematic thinking. </p>

<p>The main goal of the book is to highlight that the research methods are the most enjoyable –and the easiest to learn- when you are actively involved and to teach the readers how to phrase questions scientifically, how to design and conduct scientific research and how to interpret and communicate the results. Furthermore, the experimental content is concerned with cognitive processes such as: sensations, perceptions, attention, learning, memory and thinking.<br />
  <br />
The book is divided into fourteen chapters. The first eight chapters present the fundamentals: the empirical method, the experimental research method, a classification of research designs, the experimental control of the variables, the physiologic indicators, ethics and the APA format of the Research Activity. The last eight chapters reveal the cognitive processes approached from the experimental psychology point of view.<br />
 <br />
Chapter three, the Observation as empirical method underlines the role of the scientific empirical observation. Psychology relies on the scientific methods because this approach is the best one for eliminating bias and opinions, for reaching a consensus about how a behavior truly operates. The scientific method provides convincing evidence because the scientists use the events in nature as the basis for studying behavior and see how differ from nonscientific approaches UNCLEAR. Most facts observed in psychology are behaviors: verbal behavior, nonverbal communication, psychological activity and so on.<br />
Chapter four, Organizing a Research Experiment, describes how a research article is created by demonstrating what goes into the manuscript for a research report. The organization of a research report follows the logical order of the steps performed in conducting the research: Searching the literature, the researches’ objectives, Designing and Conducting the Study (Defining the independent variables, defining the Dependent Variables, the Hypothesis), the results and the conclusions. The book offers both nonexperimental and experimental approaches highlighted by the nonexperimental/experimental designs’ illustrations: Single-Group, Pretest-Posttest Studies; Pretest-Posttest Control-Group Studies; Randomized, Pretest-Posttest, Control-Group Design; Multilevel, Completely Randomized, Between Subjects Design and so on. Furthermore, the experimental designs are followed by the statistical procedures recommended for each design depending on the level of measurement of the dependent variable.   </p>

<p>Chapter five provides the aspects of Selecting and Controlling the Variables. Defining the Independent Variables requires selecting the particular conditions we will present to the participants. Specifically, the researcher must decide on the number of conditions and on the specific amount or category of the independent variable that each condition will present. Talking about the Manipulation of the Independent Variable there are few approaches: Presenting Different Stimuli (presenting different stimuli or changing the characteristics of the stimuli); Manipulating Context (often the independent variable is the context in which a stimulus is presented); Manipulating Information Given Subjects (the independent variable may consist of the instructions or information given to subjects in each conditions); Stressing a Psychological System (to infer from subjects’ responses how the system normally operates) and Physiological Investigation (the manipulation of the internal physiological processes). In selecting from any of these approaches, the Construct Validity and the Content Validity play a major role. Furthermore, the Temporal Validity and Ecological Validity play an important role in the control of the variables.</p>

<p>Chapter six reveals the following Dependent Variables: the physiological variables, the motor reactions and the verbal responses. The EEG, REG, EMG and EOG indicators make the objectives of the experimental approach offered by the book. Also, the involvement of the EEG in the study of the dream, attention and emotions is highlighted. In order to introduce the motor reaction précised measured in experimental studies, the time reaction variable play a major role. An attractive objective of the book consists in presenting the Vienna Test System Unit. One of the main tasks is measuring the time reaction using Vienna Test System. The book introduces the Psychological Computerized tests presented in images. Also the independent and dependent variables are described for each test.<br />
Ethics and APA Format for research is explained in chapter seven and chapter eight.  </p>

<p>The standards for planning and conducting research on human subjects are focused on: Planning Research; Responsibility; Compliance with Law and Standards; Institutional Approval; Research Responsibilities; Sharing and Utilizing Data; Providing Participants with Information about the Study and So On. Furthermore the APA Format for the research report is completely described in chapter eight. </p>

<p>	Beginning with chapter nine the author is introducing us in the Experimental Approach of the Cognitive Processes.  Thus Chapter nine, The Experimental Approach of the Sensations highlights the concepts of Psychophysics, Absolute threshold, Difference threshold and Sensory Adaptation. The five senses are approached from the experimental point of view: Vision (the stimuli registered in our eyes are actually electromagnetic radiation waves to which our visual apparatus is sensitive and capable of responding); The Sense of Sound and Balance; Smell; Taste and Skin Senses. In the end of the chapter instruments and procedures of stimuli detection are presented.</p>

<p>	Chapter ten reveal the Experimental Approach of the Perception: perceptual organization; the Gestalt Laws of Organization ; Feature Analysis (how we perceive a shape, pattern, object); Motion Perception; Top-Down and Bottom-Up Processing and Depth Perception (Translating 2-D to 3-D). The main attraction of this chapter consist in introducing and presenting the Vienna Test System Unit with the Peripheral Perceptual Test, Appreciation of Speed and Distances-DEST test, the HYPO test, GFT test and 3 D perception test (PST 13).<br />
	The Experimental Approach of the Attention is highlighted in chapter eleven. The author presents the models of attention; the independent and dependent variables involved in the experimental approach of the computerized tests (Vienna Test System). Furthermore, the attention is approached from the neuroscience point of view (fMRI, EEG and Evoked Potential).</p>

<p>	The Memory and Learning Processes are presented by the author in chapter twelve and thirteen. The independent and dependent variables play a major role in the Experimental Approach of the Memory and Learning processes. </p>

<p>	The last chapter, chapter fourteen highlights aspects of Experimental Approach of Problem Solving and Thinking. The author presents the main concepts: inductive reasoning; deductive reasoning; algorithm; heuristic. The independent and dependent variables are presented by revealing laboratory experiments and problem solving procedures.<br />
 	The book has got three main goals: to provide effective and broad coverage of the field of Experimental Psychology introducing readers to the theories, research and application that constitute the science; to provide an impetus for students to begin to think as psychologists and become more engaged, stimulating their interest, arousing readers’ intellectual curiosity and building an appreciation of how psychology can increase their understanding of the world around them.<br />
</p>]]>

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Research Methods in Social Psychology: A Comparative Analysis</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/archives/2008/02/research_method.html" />
<modified>2008-02-17T20:42:25Z</modified>
<issued>2008-02-15T22:26:11Z</issued>
<id>tag:www.ejop.org,2008://1.153</id>
<created>2008-02-15T22:26:11Z</created>
<summary type="text/plain">


Research in social psychology would be inconceivable today without the use of questionnaires, interviews and focus groups. This essay will briefly present all three methods and compare their characteristics through an analysis of their importance for stereotype, identity and social representations research. 
Both questionnaires and interviews / focus groups help researchers gather verbal data and all start from the same key-element: questions. This aspect is most obvious in the case of questionnaires that may resemble a “simple” set of questions.</summary>
<author>
<name>andreea</name>

<email>psy.journal@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<dc:subject>Theoretical Contributions</dc:subject>
<content type="text/html" mode="escaped" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.ejop.org/">
<![CDATA[<p><strong>Vlad-Petre Glăveanu<br />
EJOP Editor</strong></p>

<p><br />
<img alt="tteoretice.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/tteoretice.jpg" width="203" height="145" /></p>

<p><br />
Research in social psychology would be inconceivable today without the use of questionnaires, interviews and focus groups. This essay will briefly present all three methods and compare their characteristics through an analysis of their importance for stereotype, identity and social representations research. </p>

<p>Both questionnaires and interviews / focus groups help researchers gather verbal data and all start from the same key-element: questions. This aspect is most obvious in the case of questionnaires that may resemble a “simple” set of questions. Nevertheless, the hardest task for researchers is to establish the right questions, formulate and then order them. Questionnaires need also to be completed by participants with certain characteristics in either a self-administered or staff-administered manner (Babbie, 1998) although it is quite common to have a combination of the two where research staff offer questionnaire for completion to a large number of subjects, inform them about the testing and assist them only if necessary.</p>

<p>If questionnaires, due to their structured nature, have come to symbolize (along with tests and experiments) the quantitative approach, interviews are often central to qualitative studies and involve a more or less guided dialogue between an interviewer and interviewee (where, unlike usual discussions, the roles of the two remain stable). The most common forms are dilemma-interviews, clinical and biographical interviews (Hopf, 2004). But, despite this apparent antagonism questionnaires and interviews “glide” into one another quite frequently. Not all interviews are qualitative and nondirective. In fact, the schedule-structure interview (Frankfort and Nachmias, 2000) is noting more than face to face application of a questionnaire. In their turn, questionnaires can include many open-ended questions that invite respondents to express their views in a completely unstandardized way.</p>

<p>In the last decades the use of group interviews has been generalised well beyond its “traditional” areas of group dynamics, persuasive communication, and mass media (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). Methodological developments have perfected focus groups as a method in its own right and not simply interviews applied in a group context. The name indicates how crucial it is for moderators to focus the group discussion on one specific topic of interest and stimulate members’ interactions (not their agreement). Although within a focus group it is not uncommon for participants to complete / score certain scales, most data is idiosyncratic in nature and thus challenging to interpret and summarize.</p>

<p>In order to understand the exact particularities, advantages and limitations of these three methods in a comparative manner it is best to take classic themes of study in social sciences as examples. In this case let us focus on the following three related topics - stereotypes, identity and social representations - standing at the heart of social psychology research.</p>

<p>The study of stereotypes has traditionally been performed by designing questionnaires that solicit attribute generation and/or evaluation. One of the first benefits of using surveys was the capacity to collect data from large samples, ensure confidentiality and obtain quantitative responses that are easy to statistically test. Despite these obvious benefits, many researchers started to doubt the capacity or willingness of respondents to “objectify” their stereotypes and more indirect approaches have been elaborated (e.g. Gaertner and McLaughlin, 1983). Such methods, largely based on cognitive and physiological principles, are also contested for failing to reveal social and motivational aspects in the elaboration and functioning of stereotypes. Interviews could be one solution for overcoming these shortcomings and generally allowing a more in-depth analysis of this phenomenon. In this case though a limited number of subjects can be studied and there is always the risk of participants distorting their beliefs due to self-presentation biases. In what concerns focus groups, they wouldn’t be particularly appropriate if the discussion is centred on personal stereotypes but can prove to be useful in investigating how respondents understand and approach cultural stereotypes.</p>

<p>Research on identity, unless following an experimental design, has employed primarily a qualitative approach and the use of interviews. In this case the claimed “incapacity” of questionnaires to offer any valuable phenomenological insight and their standardized nature led to lesser usage. However, as argued before, questionnaires can include open-ended questions and seem to be particularly fit to assess aspects like self-esteem (although rarely to explain it). It is through interviews that social psychologists commonly address the problem of identity. Recognized as representative for a “thematic, topic-centred, biographical and narrative approach” (Mason, 2002), interviews allow respondents the necessary freedom to explore and express their self-identity. Acknowledging the fact that identities are socially constructed and dependent on social interaction allows focus groups to be used almost to the same extent as individual interviews. Focus group research on identity (Howarth, 2002) has been helpful in observing how identities are generated, played out and transformed at the level of the community.</p>

<p>Finally, the social representations theory, that tried to surpass a rather individualistic view on stereotypes and identity and to “recover the social”, nowadays relies extensively on interviews and focus groups as means of investigation. Although the capacity of these methods to explore both the individual and group level dynamics of representations is undeniable, many traditional studies in the field, especially those following a structural approach, used questionnaires and data that were straightforwardly quantified. Maybe the peak accomplishment in this regard is that of Guimelli and Rouquette (1992), who turned their model of basic cognitive schemes into 28 questions. Again questionnaires have proved to be very effective in collecting clear-cut responses and organizing them according to research purposes. </p>

<p>In concluding, questionnaires, interviews and focus groups all have their special strengths and limitations. In order to surpass the disadvantages two basic recommendations can be formulated. The first is to consider the nature of the research topic and to make an informed and careful selection of method(s). Second, to use whenever possible multiple methods in order to increase the chances of obtaining more types of data and a larger range of perspectives. Nevertheless, this method triangulation should be thought of strategically and not just eclectically (Mason, 2002) and always in relation to the particular research objectives. </p>

<p><strong>References</strong></p>

<p><br />
Babbie, E. (1998). The Practice of Social Research, eighth edition. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company. </p>

<p>Frankfort-Nachmias, C. & Nachmias, D. (2000). Research Methods in the Social Sciences, sixth edition. New York: Worth Publishers.<br />
 <br />
Gaertner, S.L. & McLaughlin, J.P. (1983). Racial stereotypes: Association and ascriptions of positive and negative characteristics. Social Psychology Quarterly, 46, pp.23-30.<br />
 <br />
Guimelli, C. & Rouquette, M.L. (1992). Contribution du modèle associatif des schèmes cognitifs de base a l’analyse structurale des représentations sociales. Bulletin de psychologie, 405, pp. 43-48.<br />
 <br />
Hopf, C. (2004). Qualitative Interviews: An Overview. In U. Flick, E. Kardoff and I. Steinke (eds.), A Companion to Qualitative Research. London: Sage, pp. 203-208. </p>

<p>Howarth, C. (2002). Identity in Whose Eyes? The Role of Representations in Identity Construction. Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, 32(2), pp. 145-162. </p>

<p>Mason, J. (2002). Qualitative Researching, second edition. London: Sage. </p>

<p>Stewart, D. & Shamdasani, P. (1990). Focus Groups: Theory and Practice. Newbury Park: Sage. </p>

<p><br />
The author has graduated from the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, University of Bucharest, and is currently an MSc student in Social and Cultural Psychology at the London School of Economics. His main interests are in: creativity, social representations, social and developmental psychology, qualitative methods.</p>

<p><strong>Contact: V.P.Glaveanu@lse.ac.uk<br />
</strong></p>]]>

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Imagery and Emotion Components of Event Descriptions about Self and Various Others</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/archives/2008/02/imagery_and_emo.html" />
<modified>2008-02-15T22:02:29Z</modified>
<issued>2008-02-15T21:10:15Z</issued>
<id>tag:www.ejop.org,2008://1.150</id>
<created>2008-02-15T21:10:15Z</created>
<summary type="text/plain">Imagery and emotion have been identified as two of the main component systems of autobiographical events.  It is not yet known, however, whether a primary focus on either the self or others may have an impact on these components.  To investigate this issue, half of the participants in this study provide a real and made-up event description about themselves, and half provide descriptions about a well-known other.</summary>
<author>
<name>andreea</name>

<email>psy.journal@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<dc:subject>Research Reports</dc:subject>
<content type="text/html" mode="escaped" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.ejop.org/">
<![CDATA[<p><strong>Nicholas A. Kuiper and Jennifer Kuindersma<br />
The University of Western Ontario<br />
London, Ontario, Canada</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p>Key words:  Imagery, Emotion, Self-other, Real made-up </p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

<p> <br />
<strong>Abstract</strong></p>

<p>	Imagery and emotion have been identified as two of the main component systems of autobiographical events.  It is not yet known, however, whether a primary focus on either the self or others may have an impact on these components.  To investigate this issue, half of the participants in this study provide a real and made-up event description about themselves, and half provide descriptions about a well-known other.  In addition, all participants generated a made-up event description about an unfamiliar other.  In accord with predictions generated from a multiple-system model, real events received higher visual detail, imagability, and positive emotion ratings than made-up events.  This pattern was also evident for a novel measure of imagery, in which real events were rated as being much more dynamic than made-up events.  However, contrary to theoretical positions which postulate a special enhanced role for self-referent information processing, the self-descriptive events were not rated as being easier to imagine and did not have more positive emotions or visual detail, than descriptive events about well-known others.  This pattern suggests that efficient cognitive schemata may be involved in the processing of information about both the self and well-known others.  In contrast, descriptions of an unfamiliar other received lower imagery and emotionality ratings, suggesting that less well-differentiated cognitive structures are involved in component processing for these individuals.  </p>

<p> <br />
	Rubin (2005) has suggested that autobiographical memories are the product of distinct component systems that include, for example, visual imagery and the emotions associated with the described event.  Research investigating this multiple-systems model has determined the relative importance of these distinct components by having persons rate their autobiographical memories on the degree of visual imagery, spatial context, and how strongly the original emotions were reinstated (Rubin, 2005).  Across several studies it has been found that the strength of recollection of an event was best predicted by the vividness of visual imagery, followed by emotions (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; Rubin, 2005). <br />
 <br />
Further research has examined how different types of memories or events may impact on the various components of the multiple-systems model.  Crawley and Eacott (2006), for example, contrasted ratings of components for autobiographical memories based on personal recollections (i.e., the birth of a younger sibling) versus memories that were clearly based on second-hand sources (i.e., family stories about one’s own birth).  Congruent with predictions generated from the multiple-systems model, the autobiographical memories displayed higher ratings for visual detail, spatial location, and emotional feelings than did the memories generated from second-hand sources.  Using a different paradigm, Kealy, Kuiper, and Klein (2006) had participants generate both real and made-up events about themselves.  Again consistent with the multiple-systems model, real events could be readily distinguished from made-up events, as the former had significantly higher imagery ratings of visual detail, location and time than the latter. <br />
 <br />
In light of the above, one purpose of the present study was to explore a further important parameter that may also impact on key components of the multiple-systems model.  In particular, we examined the extent to which a primary focus on either self or others, when describing events, may also bear on the imagery and emotion components of this model.  Although it is clear that we can have distinct memories about self and highly familiar others (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Symons & Johnson, 1997), little is yet known about the extent to which these memories can be distinguished in terms of the various components of the multiple-systems model.  Accordingly, we examined this issue by having participants in the present study provide both real and made-up event descriptions about themselves and a well-known other currently significant in their lives (e.g., a close friend).  One possibility here is that the component ratings for self-referent event descriptions, when compared with descriptions about well-known others, may be richer in imagery and higher in emotionality.  Such a pattern would be consistent with the notion that the self provides for very elaborate processing of personally relevant information than is even more enhanced than the processing of information about well-known others (Kircher et al., 2000).  In turn, this greater elaboration would result in higher imagery and emotionality ratings for the self-referent events.  Furthermore, by including both real and made-up events, we could determine the extent to which such a self-referent enhancement pattern may be evident across both these types of events.</p>

<p>	Alternatively, it is also quite possible that there will be no distinction between the component ratings for the self versus well-known other event descriptions.  In contrast to the notion that self-referent processing is uniquely elaborate (Kircher et al., 2000), several other investigators have highlighted the substantial similarities between self and well-known other information processing (Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Symons & Johnson, 1997).  Some of these researchers have proposed that individuals also develop and employ very efficient cognitive schemata for processing personal information about significant others, thus resulting in quite similar elaboration for both self and well-known others (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979).  If this is the case, then one would not expect differences between the component ratings for self versus well-known others.  In other words, the self-referent event descriptions would not display higher imagery and emotionality ratings than those for well-known others.</p>

<p>	A further goal of the present study was to examine the potential effects of degree of familiarity of the other-referent target on imagery and emotion component ratings.  Thus, in addition to the well-known other condition, participants also provided a made-up event description about an individual they were just meeting for the first time, namely, the experimenter.  Previous research indicates that the processing of personal information about such unfamiliar individuals is relatively inefficient and is not schema-based (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979).  Thus, without any specific cognitive structure or knowledge base concerning this unfamiliar other, processing would lack the degree of elaboration evident for well-known others or the self.  In turn, this suggests that it would be more difficult to image a made-up event about this unfamiliar other, and it would have significantly less emotionality, when compared to the made-up events about well-known others or the self.</p>

<p>	Finally, given the central role of visual imagery in the multiple-systems model (Rubin, 2005), we wanted to expand this component of the model to also include consideration of imagery dynamics.  As described by Enright (1997) this term refers to the movement characteristics associated with an image.  Thus, some events are imagined in a static fashion, like a still picture, whereas others may be more dynamic, like a slide show.  Finally, other events may be the most dynamic of all, and imagined more like a movie.  In her research, Enright found that real autobiographical memories were much more dynamic than made-up events about the self.  Accordingly, this additional component of imagery was assessed in our study by having participants provide an imagery dynamic judgment for each event description.  Here, we predicted that that real events would be more dynamic than made-up events.  Furthermore, to the extent that self-referent event descriptions are indeed more elaborate than event descriptions about a well-known other, they would also display more imagery dynamics.  Conversely, if self-referent and well-known other referent event descriptions are equally elaborated, we would not expect any imagery dynamic distinctions between these two conditions.  Finally, we expected that the made-up event descriptions for an unfamiliar other (i.e. the experimenter) would be much more static in terms of imagery dynamics than either the self or well-known other descriptions.  Such a pattern would reflect the lack of an efficient cognitive schema for processing personal information about an unfamiliar other.</p>

<p><strong>Method</strong></p>

<p><br />
<strong>Participants.</strong>  Ninety students (61 females and 29 males) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at the University of Western Ontario participated.  The mean age was 19.43, with a range from 18 to 30.<br />
Event Descriptions and Instructions.  Each participant provided a total of three written pleasant event descriptions, consisting of one real and one made-up event about either self or a well-known other; and one made-up event about an unfamiliar other (i.e., the experimenter).  The real events were to have happened within the past 3 months.  The made-up events were to be realistic and plausible, and were also to be written as if they had happened within the last 3 months.  The instructions for each event description were as similar as possible, and each emphasized a focus on the specific target for that particular event (i.e., self, well-known other, and unfamiliar other).  Participants were instructed to write about the event without stopping, and to write from the feelings and sensations they experienced with the event.</p>

<p>Imagery Ratings.   Participants rated the specific degree of visual detail evident for each event by using a 7-point scale, with 1 indicating “none at all”, 4 indicating “a moderate amount”, and 7 indicating “very much.”  Participants also rated how easy it was to imagine each event, with this imagability rating made on a 7-point scale, with 1 indicating “not at all”, 4 indicating “moderately”, and 7 indicating “very easily”.  Finally, participants also indicated how dynamic their images were by selecting one of the following descriptors for each event: (1) “Still, like a photograph”;  (2) “A series of still pictures, like a slide show”;  (3)  “Moving, like a movie; or (4) “No image is present”. </p>

<p>Emotion Ratings.  Participants used a 7-point scale to rate the degree to which each event contained positive feelings, with 1 indicating “not at all”, 4 indicating “a moderate amount”, and 7 indicating “very much.”  An identically labeled second 7-point rating scale was used to provide a separate rating of the negative feelings associated with each event.</p>

<p>Selection of a Well-Known Other Target.  Specific well-know other targets were selected using a brief form that highlights three individuals currently important in each participant’s life (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979).  Participants indicated the extent to which each of these individuals was known to them, using a 5-point familiarity scale ranging from “Moderately well” (1) to “Extremely well” (5). </p>

<p> Participants also indicated how many hours per week they spent with each of these individuals, and the type of relationship involved (e.g., close friend, boyfriend/girlfriend, siblings, or parents).  The individual with the highest rating on the 5-point scale was then selected as that participant’s well-known other target.  The mean familiarity rating for the 46 well-known others selected as targets in the present study was 4.87 (sd of .34).  If there was a tie in familiarity ratings, then the individual the participant spent the most time with per week was selected as the target.  On average, participants spent 28.33 hours per week with their selected targets.  Twenty-two of the selected well-known others were close friends, 8 were boyfriends or girlfriends, 7 were mothers, 6 were siblings, and 3 were fathers.</p>

<p></p>

<p><strong>Procedure</strong>.  Participants were tested in groups of up to 4, with each session lasting approximately 40 minutes.  Alternating with each session, participants were placed in either the self or well-known other condition (n’s of 44 and 46, respectively).  Therefore, participants either provided one real and one made-up description about themselves, or one real and one made-up event description about a well-known other.  Each participant (regardless of self or well-known other condition), also provided a made-up event description about an unfamiliar other (the experimenter).  The presentation order for these events was varied across sessions.</p>

<p>	After reading and signing an informed consent form, participants in the well-known other condition completed the brief form to select their own well-known other target.  Participants were then read the instructions for completing the real and made-up event descriptions for the self and other targets.  After each event was written, participants completed the imagery and emotion ratings for that target.   Following completion of the final event description and ratings, each participant was given a debriefing form and credit for participation in the study.</p>

<p><br />
<strong>Results</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p>Real and Made-up Events: Self versus Well-Known Others<br />
	The means and standard deviations for ratings of imagery and emotion components are shown in Table 1.  Each measure was analyzed using a 2 (Event: Real, Made-up) x 2 (Target: Self, Well-known Other) analysis of variance (ANOVA). </p>

<p> Table 1 Event Component Ratings: Means (and Standard Deviations) by Event Type and Target</p>

<p><img alt="imag emotions 1.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/imag emotions 1.jpg" width="460" height="300" /></p>

<p><br />
Imagery.  The ANOVA for the visual detail rating revealed the expected significant main effect of Event, F = 6.45, p < .05; with real events having significant higher amounts of visual detail than made-up events (respective main effect means of 5.75 vs. 5.20).  In a similar fashion, the ANOVA on the imagability ratings also revealed the expected significant main effect of Event, F = 29.88, p < .001.  Here, real events were deemed to be easier to imagine than made-up events (with respective means of 6.33 vs. 5.44).  For both of these imagery ratings, neither the main effects of Target, nor the two-way interactions were significant, all F’s < 2.  Thus, self-referent events were not easier to imagine than well-known other events (with respective means of 5.80 vs. 5.98).  Nor did self-referent events contain more visual detail than events focusing on a well-known other (respective means of 5.63 vs. 5.33).  Furthermore, it was also not the case than any imagability distinctions between self and well-known others emerged as interactions involving Event by Target.</p>

<p><br />
Table 2</p>

<p>Distribution of Imagery Dynamic Categories</p>

<p>a)  For Real versus Made-up Events (Combining Self & Well-known Others)<br />
<img alt="imag emot 2.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/imag emot 2.jpg" width="448" height="118" /></p>

<p>b)  For Made-up Events Only (Self & Well-known Others versus Unfamiliar Other)<br />
<img alt="imag ewmotions 3.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/imag ewmotions 3.jpg" width="448" height="85" /></p>

<p></p>

<p>Table 2a shows the frequency distribution for the imagery dynamic categories for all of the real versus made-up events.  As expected, a significant chi-square analysis, χ2 (3) = 8.93, p< .01 indicated that real events were considered more dynamic than made-up events.  In particular, real event images were most often viewed as “moving” or being a “series” of images.  In contrast, made-up event images were more often seen as being “still” or as a “series” of images; and less often as “moving.”  This pattern supports a clear distinction between real and made-up events in terms of imagery dynamics.</p>

<p>Two further chi-square analyses were then performed to investigate whether the self or well-known other nature of the target had any impact on the imagery dynamics for either the real or the made up events.  No significant relationships were found for either the real or made-up distributions.  These findings indicate that the imagery dynamics associated with event descriptions about the self could not be reliably distinguished from those about a well-known other, for either type of event.</p>

<p><br />
	Emotions.  In accord with prior research, a significant main effect of Event was found for positive emotions, F = 23.46, p < .001, with the real events having more positive feelings associated with them than the made-up events (respective main effect means of 6.50 vs. 5.86).  Self-referent events, however, did not have more positive feelings than well-known other events (respective means of 6.18 vs. 6.17),  F < 1; nor was the two-way interaction significant, F < 1.  Finally, the ANOVA for the negative feelings rating revealed that none of the three sources of variance were significant, all F’s < 1.  This non-significance may reflect the fact that only pleasant events were being described, and thus there may have been an overall paucity of negative feelings associated with these events.</p>

<p><br />
Made-up Events Only: Self or Well-known Others versus Unfamiliar Other<br />
	</p>

<p>Table 3</p>

<p>Made-up Event Component Ratings: Means (Standard Deviations) and t-test p-values<br />
<img alt="imag emotions  4.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/imag emotions  4.jpg" width="448" height="181" /></p>

<p><br />
Table 3 presents the imagery and emotion ratings for the made-up events only, for all three targets.  Two separate sets of paired-sample t-tests were performed on this data: one set for the group of 44 participants that provided made-up events about both themselves and an unfamiliar other (as shown in the left portion of Table 3); and a further set for the remaining 46 participants that provided made-up event descriptions about both a well-know other and an unfamiliar other (right portion of Table 3).</p>

<p><br />
	Self vs. Unfamiliar Other.  The self-referent made-up events displayed significantly more visual detail than the unfamiliar other events, t (43) = 4.44, p< .001, and were significantly easier to imagine, t (43) = 4.17, p< .001.  Finally, greater positive emotions were also associated with the self-referent made-up events, when compared with the unfamiliar other made-up events, t (43) =3.86, p< .001.  In summary, the made-up events about the self were clearly distinguishable from those about an unfamiliar other, with the only non-significant comparison involving negative feelings<br />
Well-known Other vs. Unfamiliar Other.  The t-test results for these comparisons are shown in the right panel of Table 3.  Well-known other events were rated as being easier to imagine, t (45) = 4.60, p< .001, but did not contain significantly more visual detail than the made-up events about an unfamiliar other.  The well-known other made-up events also had significantly more positive emotions than the unfamiliar other events, t (45) = 4.46, p< .001, but did not display any difference in terms of negative feelings.  Overall, these findings suggest that although well-known other made-up events can still be distinguished from made-up events about an unfamiliar other, this distinction is not quite as clear as that found for self-referent versus unfamiliar other made-up events.</p>

<p><br />
Imagery Dynamics for Made-up Events.  A preliminary chi-squared analysis revealed that the distribution of imagery dynamic categories for the made-up events was not contingent upon the self versus well-known other nature of the target.  Accordingly, Table 2b presents the frequency distribution of imagery dynamic categories for the combined self and well-known other targets versus the unfamiliar other made-up events.  A chi-square analysis on this distribution revealed a significant relationship, χ2 (3) = 12.55, p< .01, such that made-up events about the self and well-known other were much more dynamic relative to made-up events about an unfamiliar other.  For example, participants reported considerably more “moving” images for the self and well-known other than for an unfamiliar other.  Conversely, there were almost twice as many “still” images for the unfamiliar other target (i.e., the experimenter) than for the combined self and well-known other targets.  Finally, it should be noted that participants had considerably more difficulty in generating images for the unfamiliar other than for the self or well-known other event descriptions (i.e., 12 vs. 4 “no images”).</p>

<p></p>

<p><strong>Discussion</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p>	Employing the multiple-systems model of autobiographical memory (Rubin 2005), the present study examined imagery and emotion component ratings for real and made-up events about self and various others.  In doing so, we found that real pleasant events were easier to imagine and contained more visual detail and positive emotions than made-up events.  This pattern is consistent with the findings reported by Kealy et al. (2006) for both pleasant and unpleasant events about the self.   These findings are also congruent with research demonstrating that real autobiographical memories can be clearly distinguished from memories derived from secondary sources, such as other family members (Crawley & Eacott, 2006).  As such, these findings provide additional support for a basic tenet of the multiple-systems model, namely that different categories of memories or recollections are reliably distinct from one another in terms of associated imagery components and emotional feelings (Rubin, 2005).</p>

<p><br />
	The present findings also extend the multiple-systems model to incorporate consideration of imagery dynamics.  Several different qualities of imagery are already recognized in this model, including vividness, visual detail, spatial elements, and visual perspective (Rubin, 2005; Rubin et al., 2003).  The present findings suggest that a further aspect of imagery, namely, its dynamic versus static quality, may also play an important role in distinguishing between various types of event descriptions and memories.  In particular, our findings indicated that images of real events were viewed as being much more dynamic in nature, and thus have much more perceived movement (i.e., being like a movie) than images of made-up events (i.e., being like a still picture).  </p>

<p>	Interestingly, we did not find any distinctions in the various ratings for self versus well-known others.  Event descriptions for both of these targets were found to be equivalent in terms of imagability, visual detail, imagery dynamics, and positive emotions.  This equivalence fails to support the notion that self-referent processing is distinct or unique (e.g., Kircher et al., 2000; Symons & Johnson, 1997).  If this had been the case, we would have expected the most elaboration for the self-referent condition, resulting in higher imagery and emotion ratings, when compared with well-known others.  Instead, the equivalence of findings supports the proposal that efficient cognitive schemata are involved in the processing of information about both the self and well-known others (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979).  These rich cognitive schemata provide detailed background knowledge and well-organized structures for processing further information for both types of targets. </p>

<p> <br />
Differences between self and others only emerged when considering the comparisons involving made-up events about an unfamiliar other (the experimenter).  Here, the self-referent events had significantly higher ratings for all of the measures, except negative emotions.  Thus, participants viewed the made-up events about the self as having more visual detail, being easier to imagine, being more dynamic and being more positive, than their made-up events about an unfamiliar other.  This pattern further supports the proposal that an efficient cognitive schema is involved in the elaboration of made-up events about the self; and that, in contrast, the processing of information about unfamiliar others is relatively inefficient and is not associated with a person-specific schema (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Symons & Johnson, 1997).  Thus, the dearth of specific background information about the unfamiliar target, coupled with the lack of a distinct cognitive structure for organizing and processing information about this individual, would limit the degree to which a made-up event about an unfamiliar other could be richly imagined or emotions could be relived.</p>

<p><br />
Additional findings from our study speak even more directly to the issue of familiarity.  In particular, several significant differences emerged between the two other-referent targets, with the well-known other event descriptions being rated as easier to image and having more positive emotions than the made-up event descriptions about an unfamiliar other.  Once again, this highlights the contrast between the use of efficient cognitive schemata for well-known others and much less efficient or elaborate processing for unfamiliar others.  Interestingly, however, there were no distinctions in terms of visual details.  As such, there may be a certain degree of similarity in visual details for other-referent targets ranging across a wide range of familiarity. <br />
     <br />
Although the present findings are informative, there are several limitations which should be acknowledged and addressed in future research.  To begin, the present study focused only on pleasant events.  Thus, it may still be the case that negative self-referent events may differ from negative events about a well-known other in terms of the various components and beliefs associated with the multiple-systems model.  In particular, the increased stress associated with personally relevant events may foster enhanced imagery, along with greater negative emotions, when compared with unpleasant events about a well-known other.   Furthermore, it is not yet known if more distant past events (i.e., more than several years old: see Sporer & Sharman, 2006) would lead to self versus well-known other differences in the various components of the multiple-systems model.   Finally, it would also be of interest to move beyond a university sample to consider an older, community based sample that may also display a different pattern of self-other similarities and differences.  </p>

<p> <br />
<strong>References</strong></p>

<p>Crawley, R.A., & Eacott, M.J. (2006).  Memories of early childhood: Qualities of the experience of recollection. Memory & Cognition, 34(2), 287-294.</p>

<p>Enright, C. (1997).  Imagery and narrative characteristics associated with autobiographical memories.</p>

<p>Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Western Ontario.<br />
Gillihan, S.J., & Farah, M.J. (2005).  Is self special? A critical review of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Psychological Bulletin, 131(1), 76-97.</p>

<p>Kealy, K.L., Kuiper, N.A., & Klein, D.N. (2006).  Characteristics associated with real and made-up events: The effects of event valence, event elaboration, and individual differences. Canadian<br />
 Journal of Behavioural Science, 38(2), 158-175.</p>

<p>Kircher, T.T., Senior, C., Phillips, M.L., Benson, P.J., Bullmore, E.T., Brammer, M., et al. (2000).<br />
Towards a functional neuroanatomy of self-processing. Effects of faces and words. Cognitive Brain Research, 10, 133-144.</p>

<p>Kuiper, N.A., & Rogers, T.B. (1979).  Encoding of personal information: Self-other differences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 499-514.</p>

<p>Rubin, D.C. (2005).  A basic-systems approach to autobiographical memory. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14(2), 79-83.</p>

<p>Rubin, D.C., Schrauf, R.W., & Greenberg, D.L. (2003).  Belief and recollection of autobiographical memories. Memory and Cognition, 31(6), 887-901.</p>

<p>Sporer, S.L., & Sharman, S. J.  Should I believe this? Reality monitoring of accounts of self-experienced and invented recent and distant autobiographical events.  Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 837-854.</p>

<p>Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B.T. (1997).  The self-reference effect in memory: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3), 371-394.</p>

<p></p>

<p><br />
Address correspondence to:  N. Kuiper, Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario,   London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7 (e-mail   kuiper@uwo.ca.    phone  1.519.661.2111 x84652)<br />
Nicholas A. Kuiper, Ph.D., C. Psych. <br />
Professor and Director <br />
Clinical Psychology Graduate Program <br />
Department of Psychology <br />
Room 309, Westminster College <br />
361 Windermere Road <br />
London, Ontario <br />
Canada  N6A 3K7<br />
kuiper@uwo.ca   519- 661-2111 x84652 <br />
fax:  519-850-2554 </p>]]>

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE, RELIGIOSITY AND SELF-EFFICACY AS PREDICTORS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING AMONG SECONDARY SCHOOL ADOLESCENTS IN OGBOMOSO, NIGERIA</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/archives/2008/02/emotional_intel.html" />
<modified>2008-02-15T22:25:52Z</modified>
<issued>2008-02-14T22:13:27Z</issued>
<id>tag:www.ejop.org,2008://1.152</id>
<created>2008-02-14T22:13:27Z</created>
<summary type="text/plain">Adolescence as a developmental period is filled with many challenges. Early developmental theorists, particularly Erickson (Erickson, 1959) have defined the period of adolescence as one of identity versus role confusion, in which adolescents must determine who they are, combining their self-understanding and social roles into a coherent identity.
	Today, Adolescents live in a society which has become multi-complex, thus making the roles of adolescents very diffuse and confusing. </summary>
<author>
<name>andreea</name>

<email>psy.journal@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<dc:subject>Research Reports</dc:subject>
<content type="text/html" mode="escaped" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.ejop.org/">
<![CDATA[<p>Adeyemo, D. A., Ph.D.<br />
and<br />
Adeleye, A. T., M.Ed.<br />
Department of Guidance and Counselling<br />
University of Ibadan, Ibadan.</p>

<p></p>

<p><br />
<strong>ABSTRACT</strong></p>

<p><br />
The study investigated emotional intelligence, religiosity and self-efficacy as predictors of psychological well-being among secondary school adolescents. The study made use of stratified random sampling in selecting 292 adolescents from ten (10) secondary schools in Ogbomoso, Oyo State, Nigeria.  The sample age ranged between 13 -20 years. Four instruments were used, namely: General Self-Efficacy Scale, Well-being Manifestation Measurement Scale; The Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS); and Religiosity Scale. Data analysis involved the use of multiple regression and Pearson Product Moment correlation. The results indicated that the three independent variables as a block were effective in predicting psychological well-being of adolescents. On the basis of the finding, it was suggested that teachers should endeavour to teach rudiments of emotional intelligence to the students while school counselors and psychologists should develop programmes to foster emotional intelligence and self-efficacy.<br />
Keywords: Emotional intelligence, Religiosity, Self-efficacy, Psychological Well-being, Adolescents.                                                                                        </p>

<p>INTRODUCTION</p>

<p><br />
Adolescence as a developmental period is filled with many challenges. Early developmental theorists, particularly Erickson (Erickson, 1959) have defined the period of adolescence as one of identity versus role confusion, in which adolescents must determine who they are, combining their self-understanding and social roles into a coherent identity.</p>

<p>	Today, Adolescents live in a society which has become multi-complex, thus making the roles of adolescents very diffuse and confusing. The roles of adolescents and their developmental tasks are no longer well defined and prescribed. Knowledge explosion, material wealth pursuit, plurality of the society and estrangement from the extended family system, the hypocrisy of adult standards, the fallacy of physical maturity all present a great battle for the adolescent to fight with the dilemma of indefinite status.</p>

<p>Coupled with this complexity are the multifarious needs (biogenic, physiogenic, sociogenic and psychogenic) that the adolescent has to satisfy. He has got exuberant energy with which to pursue his needs but perhaps not the logical rationale with which to estimate the balance between degrees of freedom and the threshold of danger. Thus,  adolescent engages in activities that pose real threat to his/ her psychological well-being.</p>

<p>            Adolescence is full of challenges. The change is fast, everywhere and hard to keep up with: the body changes in response to increasing levels of sex hormones; the thinking process changes as the child is able to  think more broadly and in abstract ways; the social life changes as new people and peers come into scope. Yet the child needs to deal with every single one of these changes, all at the same time! Thus, making the issue of psychological well-being, that of adolescence.</p>

<p>Psychological well-being is a multi-dimensional concept. Cheerfulness, optimism, playfulness, self-control, a sense of detachment and freedom from frustration, anxiety and loneliness had been accepted as dimensions of psychological well-being ( Sinha & Verma, 1992). McCulloch (1991) has shown that satisfaction, morale, positive affect and social support constitute psychological well-being. <br />
Psychological well-being is a point of much emphasis in society today. Whereas insurance companies and society in general once thought of a person’s health mainly in physical terms, in modern society personal wellness has come to refer to a more thorough definition that includes psychological well-being. In regard to psychological well-being, within the literature, happiness has generally been viewed as the outcome variable (Ryff, 1989).</p>

<p>Traditionally, psychological research has focused on negative states, their determinants and consequences (Shehan, 1984, Chang, 1998). Studies on depression, separation, alienation and similar topics focus on people’s suffering and its deleterious effects on their psychological and physical states until relatively recently, when few studies have been conducted on subjective moods or feelings of well-being and their determinants (Crocker, Luthertanen, Baline,  & Broadnax, 1994).</p>

<p>Perhaps, due to the fact that psychological well-being is a subjective term which means different things to different people, earliest literature focused on short-term affective well-being (happiness) at the expense of enduring effects. Ryff(1989) operationally defined psychological well-being as: self-acceptance, and personal growth. The theory behind this view aimed at measuring all aspects of this form of well-being and created a broader, more accurate definition.</p>

<p>However, there are remarkable differences in the abilities of adolescents to cope with the challenges which confront them. Some adolescents have great difficulty in dealing with problems which for others would be minor. When these young people are not able to cope with stresses in an adaptive manner they may develop problem behaviours and are at risk of developing mental health problems. Other adolescents with major problems seem to be able to emerge from stressful encounter not only successfully, but also with increased abilities and resources (Seoffge-Kreake, 1995).</p>

<p>It is worthy to note that contemporary studies undoubtedly show that higher functions in no small measure develop under the influence of social and cultural factors. Perhaps the reason why emotional intelligence though adopted as a relatively new concept, has always, even if largely unacknowledged, been a part of humanity. It is a novel area with regard to research, especially with regard to testing emotional intelligence and establishing the role of emotional intelligence during the adolescence.</p>

<p>Adolescence is in and of itself a difficult challenge in the realms of emotions. The adolescent is faced with new relationships and atmosphere where proper social integration is of utmost importance for success. As the adolescent travels on this journey to the time of graduation and engages in the progression towards adulthood, being emotionally competent is not only important, it is a necessary ingredient for successful journey. Goleman (1995) stated that students who have emotional competency can better deal with the pressure of peer politics, the higher demands required for academics, and the temptations of alcohol, drugs and sex.</p>

<p>             According to Salovey and Mayer (1990), emotional intelligence involves abilities that may be categorized into five domains:<br />
i)	Self-Awareness - observing oneself and recognizing a feelings as it happens.<br />
ii)	Managing emotions - handling feelings so that they are appropriate; realizing what is behind a feeling; finding ways to handle fears and anxieties, anger and sadness.<br />
iii)	Motivating oneself- Channeling emotions in the service of a goal; emotional self-control; delaying gratification and stifling impulses.<br />
iv)	Empathy- Sensitivity to others’ feelings and concerns and taking their perspective, appreciating the difference in how people are feeling about things.<br />
v)	Handling relationship:  managing emotions in others; social competence and social skills.</p>

<p>              A look at the domains summarized above, shows that they have a wide range of useful implications for adolescents in secondary schools. When faced with the struggle of broken families, abuse, the temptation of drugs, alcohol and sex as well as other struggles all five factors of emotional intelligence can contribute to an adolescent being true to himself or herself. Furthermore, these domains can assist in fostering a strong form of development in body, mind and spirit for each adolescent.</p>

<p>According to Mayer and Cobb (2000), the current definition of emotional intelligence as defined by Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000), includes the capacity to perceive, understand and manage emotions”. A student high in emotional intelligence based on the above definition should have some of the elements required for also being high in psychological well-being such as self-acceptance, positive relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life and personal growth.<br />
Emotional intelligence has been theoretically related to several important human values including life satisfaction, the quality of interpersonal relationships, and success in occupations that involve considerable reasoning with emotional information such as those involving creativity, leadership, sales and psychotherapy (Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 1995; Palmer, Walls, Burgess, & Tough, 2001; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). It was noted in the findings of Palmer, Donaldson and Stough (2001) that emotional intelligence was moderately correlated with psychological well-being and significantly explained some of the variance in psychological well- being.</p>

<p>Religiosity includes having or showing belief in and reverence for God or a deity, as well as participation in activities pertaining to that faith such as attending services/worship regularly and participating in other social activities with one’s religious community. Religiosity has been linked to a greater sense of well-being in late adulthood as well as to the ability to better cope with stressful events in middle adulthood [Koenig, Smiley, & Gonzalez, 1999;  Santrock 2002].</p>

<p>Religious practices and beliefs often play a role in understanding oneself and the world especially when given meaning and value for the relation between oneself, others, surrounding environment and existence (Canda,1989).  Religious beliefs become more abstract, more principled, and more independent during the adolescence years. Specifically, adolescents’ beliefs become rituals, practices and strict observance of religions customs (Steinberg, 2002).</p>

<p>Generally speaking, the stated importance of religion- and especially of participation in an organized religion - declines somewhat during the adolescence years. More younger adolescents than older adolescents attend church regularly, and, not surprisingly, more of younger adolescents state that religion is important to them (Benson, Donahue & Erickson, 1989; Johnson, O’Malley, & Bachman, 1986).</p>

<p>Some, but not all, researches suggest that religious adolescents are less depressed than other adolescents, significantly less likely than peers to engage in premarital sexual intercourse, and somewhat less likely to engage in deviant behaviour, (Benson et al; 1989; Donahue, 1994; Litchfield, Thomas, & Li 1997; Wright, Frost, & Wisecarver, 1993). Not only does religious participation affect other aspects of adolescents’ behaviour, but certain behaviour themselves also affect religious participation.</p>

<p>The implications of religion and spirituality for individual well-being had captured the attention of many foundational social theorists, [ e.g Marx, 1844,   Freud, 1928;  James , 1912; Weber, 1958; & Maslow, 1954]. However, there has been renewed interest in systemically exploring the interface between religi-spirituality and psychological well-being. Drawing across studies from this body of research, several recent review articles have concluded that there is a modest salutary association between various aspects of religi-spirituality and psychological well-being (Hackney & Sanders, 2003; Koenig & Larson, 2001; Sawatzky, Ratner, & Chiu 2005).</p>

<p>Earlier classic theorizing (Durkheim,1951) on the importance of social integration for individual well-being suggests how religious participation might lead to individuals better psychological well-being noting that engagement with institutions like religion can serve to temper individuals’ desire and thereby help them to achieve better psychological well-being. Scholars have suggested that religious involvement promotes individuals well-being by providing them access to social support, a source from which to cultivate soul identity, as well as a factor that encourages individuals to avoid negative health behaviours (George, Ellison, & Larson 2002).</p>

<p>Findings from previous studies that simultaneously have examined multiple dimensions of psychological well-being suggest that different patterns of association between religiosity, spirituality, and well-being are likely to emerge across diverse dimensions of psychological well-being (e.g. Frasier, Mintz, & Mobley 2005; Maselko & Kubzansky, 2006).Corroborating earlier researchers, Greenfield and Nadine (2007), noted that associations between more frequent formal religious participation and psychological well-being were largely contingent upon the dimension of psychological well-being under consideration. </p>

<p>Self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977) provides insight into the components of human motivation and behaviour. The theory posits the importance of perceived self-efficacy as the primary stimulus for pursuing a behaviour. Self-efficacy is one’s belief in his or her ability to perform a specific behaviour to achieve an outcome. </p>

<p>Self-efficacy is usually thought to influence behaviour in specific domains of action and is considered to be a universal construct, which applies to all individuals regardless of race, gender or culture. Self-efficacy beliefs determine an individuals’ resiliency to adversity and her vulnerability to stress and depression (Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Gerbino & Pastorelli, 2003).General self-efficacy aims at a broad and stable sense of personal competence to deal effectively with a variety of stressful situations (Scherer et al., 1982; Schwarzer, 1994). Research reported that general self-efficacy was related to physical and mental health (Wang & Liu, 2000).</p>

<p>Purpose of the Study</p>

<p> Due to the increasing maladjusted behaviour manifested by many adolescents and against the proven empirical facts that adolescence is not necessarily inherently stressful, it is necessary to have a look at the factors that contribute to psychological well-being of adolescents. Specifically the study examined emotional intelligence, religiosity and self-sefficacy as predictors of psychological well-being.</p>

<p><br />
   Research questions</p>

<p><br />
 Based on articulated objectives of the study, the following research questions were addressed in the work.<br />
1.     Are there significant relationships among emotional intelligence, religiosity and self-efficacy and psychological well-being?<br />
2.	What is the joint effect of emotional intelligence, religiosity and self-efficacy on psychological well-being?<br />
3.	What is the separate effect of emotional intelligence, religiosity and self-efficacy on psychological well-being?</p>

<p><strong><br />
 METHODOLOGY</strong></p>

<p><br />
Research Design</p>

<p><br />
 The descriptive survey research design was adopted for the study. In this type of design, the researchers are interested in knowing the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variables without necessarily manipulating the independent variables.</p>

<p> Participants</p>

<p><br />
 Ten secondary schools were randomly selected from the five local government areas in Ogbomoso. Stratified random sampling was employed where each local government formed a stratum. In each of the local governments, two schools were randomly selected and 30 students were selected from each school. The age of the respondents ranges between 13 and 20 years, with a mean age of 15.90 and SD of 3.4. There were 161 (55.1%) males and 151 (44.9%) females. There were 230 (78.8%) Christians and 62 (21.2) Muslims.<br />
                                                           <strong>Instrumentation<br />
</strong></p>

<p> Five instruments were used to collect the data for the study. The description of the instruments is given below:<br />
The General Self-Efficacy Scale: The scale was developed by Matthias Jerusalem and Ralf Schwarger in 1979 with German version which was later revised. It was developed to assess a general sense of perceived self-efficacy for adult population, including adolescents. Responses are made on a 4-point scale and summing up the responses to all ten items to yield the final composite score ranging from 10 to 40. In samples from 23 nations, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .76 to .90, with the majority in the high .80. The scale is unidimensional. Criterion - related validity is documented in numerous correlations studies. The response format is 1 = Not at all true, 2 = Hardly true, 3 = Moderately true, 4 = Exactly true.</p>

<p>Well-being Manifestation Measurement Scale: This scale was developed by Masse, Poulin, Dassa, Lambert, Belair and Battaglini (1998b). The need for a scale which is shorter and easy to administer informed the choice of this scale. The scale contains 25 - items with six factors. The six factors are control of self and event, happiness, social involvement, self-esteem, mental balance, and sociability. Masse et al (1998a) found an overall Cronbach alpha of 0.93 = .85 and a range of .71 on the subscales. They also found that the item explained 52% of the variance in psychological well-being.</p>

<p>Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS): The scale was designed by Wong and Law (2002) based on the four dimensions of emotional intelligence as proposed by Davis et al 1998. It consists of 16 items in which 4 items were drawn from each dimension. <br />
Self-Emotional Appraisal (SEA), Other Emotional Appraisal (OEA), Use of Emotional (UOE) and Regulation Of Emotion (ROE). Emotional intelligence scale yield coefficient alpha of: Self Emotion, 0.89, Regulation Of Emotion 0.89, Use Of Emotion 0.80, and Others Emotion 0.89.</p>

<p>Religiosity Scale: This scale was developed by the researchers in the course of the research work. The scale is made up of 12 items. Responses are made on a 5 - point Likert format i.e. Strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided, Disagree. It has a reliability coefficient of 0.88 determined by test-retest method.</p>

<p>Procedure</p>

<p>The questionnaires were administered on the participants in their various schools following the approval of the school authorities. The administration of the instruments took one week. As a result of the fact that the participants had to respond to four instruments, it was not possible to retrieve them on the very day of administration. This necessitated further visits by the researchers. Of the three hundred distributed, two hundred and ninety-two were retrieved. This represents a response rate of 97.3%. </p>

<p><strong> Data Analysis</strong></p>

<p><br />
 Data were analysed using Pearson product moment correlation and multiple regression analysis.</p>

<p><strong>RESULTS</strong></p>

<p>Table 1: Mean, Standard Deviation Correlation among the Variables<br />
<img alt="emoimt 1.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/emoimt 1.jpg" width="448" height="247" /></p>

<p><br />
Table 1 shows that:<br />
1. Emotional intelligence, religiosity and self-efficacy have significant relationship with psychological well-being (P<0.05)<br />
2. Religiosity has a significant relationship with emotional intelligence (P<0.05) but not with self-efficacy (P>0.05).<br />
3. Self-efficacy has a significant relationship with emotional intelligence (P<0.05) but not with religiosity (P>0.05).<br />
4. Emotional intelligence has a significant relationship with religiosity and self - efficacy (P<0.05).</p>

<p>Table 2: Regression Analysis showing the joint effect of emotional intelligence, religiosity and self-efficacy on the psychological well-being of the respondents.<br />
<img alt="emoint2.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/emoint2.jpg" width="448" height="247" /></p>

<p><br />
       From table 2, it was found that the linear combination of  religiosity, self-efficacy and emotional intelligence had significant effect on the psychological well-being of the respondents  (F(3,288) = 63.218, P<0.05). The independent variables also yielded a coefficient of multiple regression (R) of 0.397, and multiple regression square (R2) adjusted of 0.391. This means that 39.1% of the total variance in psychological well-being of the participants could be explained by the combination of religiosity, self-efficacy and emotional intelligence.</p>

<p>Table 3: Relative contributions of the independent variables on psychological well-being of the respondents<br />
<img alt="emoint 3.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/emoint 3.jpg" width="448" height="247" /></p>

<p><br />
Table 3 shows  for each independent variable, the unstandardised regression weight (β), the standard error of estimate (SEβ), the standardized coefficient, the t-ratio and level at which the T-ratio is significant. Emotional intelligence made the highest contribution (β = .544, t= 10.598, P<0.05). This is followed by self-efficacy which contributed (β = .179, t = 3.66, P<.05) and then religiosity (β=.003,t=.065, P> .05 ).</p>

<p><br />
 Discussion</p>

<p><br />
 Results as shown in table 2 indicate that the three independent variables (emotional intelligence, religiosity and self-efficacy) as a block seem to be effective in predicting psychological well-being of secondary school adolescents. The observed F-ratio is significant ( F (3,288 = 63.218, P<0.05). The multiple regression square (R2) value of (0.397) suggested that about 39.7% of the total variation in the adolescents’ psychological well-being is accounted for by a linear combination of the three independent variables. </p>

<p>Results from table 3 show the extent to which each of the independent variables contributed to the prediction and the value of t-ratio associated with respective variables. It indicates that emotional intelligence and self-efficacy contributed significantly to the prediction of psychological wel-lbeing of the adolescents while religiosity did not. The values of the standardised regression weights associated with these variables indicate that emotional intelligence made the greatest contribution followed by self-efficacy and then religiosity. The results corroborate the finding of De Lazzari (2000) that emotional intelligence was moderately correlated with psychological well-being and that it explained some of the variance in psychological well-being.</p>

<p>The significant contribution of emotional intelligence to the prediction of the psychological well-being of the adolescent is explicable considering the central role emotion - (its understanding and use) plays in the psychological well-being of people. Considering the definition of emotional intelligence by Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2000), as “the capacity to perceive, assimilate, understand and manage emotion”, a student high in emotional intelligence based on the above definition should have some of the elements required for also being high in psychological well-being such as self-acceptance, positive relations with others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, and personal growth. Combining the concept of social perspective taking with emotional intelligence from a developmental perspective, one might come to recognise the impact of emotional intelligence on psychological well-being.</p>

<p>A variety of inferences can be drawn as to why adolescents who are high in emotional intelligence also score high in psychological well-being. One explanation is that adolescents with high scores in emotional intelligence have a good knowledge of their emotions and this is characterised by self-awareness which is critical to self-acceptance which has been operationalised as a domain of psychological well-being [see, Ryff,1989]. Awareness of ones emotion is also crucial to autonomy (self-determination, independence and ability to regulate ones behaviour) and personal growth, both of which are domains of psychological well-being.  </p>

<p>Self-efficacy significant contribution to the prediction of psychological well- being is consistent with the assertion of Wang and Liu, (2000) that general self-efficacy was related to physical and mental health. Also, self-efficacy aims at a broad and stable sense of personal competence to deal effectively with a variety of stressful situations [ Schwarzer, 1994]. Again, self-efficacy beliefs determine an individual resiliency to adversity and vulnerability to stress and depression (Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Gerbino & Pastorelli, 2003).</p>

<p>The finding that religiosity did not contribute significantly to psychological well- being of the adolescents is inconsistent with previous studies which have suggested that increased religious participation leads to enhanced well-being over time (Strawbridge, Shema, & Cohen, 2001).  However, this is explicable using the assertions of Greenfield and Nadine (2007), that associations between more frequent formal religious participation and psychological well-being were largely contingent upon the dimension of psychological well-being. Furthermore, findings from previous studies that simultaneously have examined multiple dimensions of psychological well-being suggest that different patterns of association between religiosity and well-being are likely to emerge across diverse dimensions of psychological well being (e.g Maselko & Kubzansky,2006 ). Based on these empirical evidences it is plausible that religiosity could only predict certain aspects of psychological well-being and not psychological well-being per se and hence the inability of religiosity to predict psychological well-being in this work. <br />
<strong></p>

<p>Implication of the findings</strong></p>

<p>       The result of this study has implication for educational settings. The fact that emotional intelligence and self-efficacy are strong predictors of psychological well-being demands that schools should begin to develop programmes to foster emotional intelligence and self-efficacy among adolescents. As emotional intelligence is teachable and learnable, teachers should endeavour to teach rudiments of emotional intelligence to students. School counsellors and psychologists could also develop emotional intelligence and self-efficacy programmes and use them to enhance psychological well-being of adolescents.</p>

<p><br />
<strong>REFERENCES</strong></p>

<p><br />
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological Review, 84, 191-215.</p>

<p>Bandura, A; Capara, G.V., Barbaranelli; C., Gerbino, M., & Pastorelli, C. (2003). Role of <br />
affective self-regulatory efficacy in diverse spheres of psychological functioning. Child development, 74, 769-782.</p>

<p>Bar - On, R. (1997): Emotional Quotient Inventory: Technical Manual. Toronto: Multi Health Systems.</p>

<p>Benson, P. Donahue, M. & Erickson, J. (1989). Adolescent and religion: Review of the Literature from 1970-1986. Research in the social scientific study of religion, 1, 153-181.</p>

<p>Berger, K., & Thompson, R. (1995). The developing person through childhood and adolescence (4th ed.). New York: Worth.</p>

<p>Canda, E. (1989). Religious content  in social work education: A comparative approach. Journal of social work education, 25, 15-24.</p>

<p>Chang , E. C.( 1998). Does dispositional optimism moderate the  relationship between perceived stress and psychological well-being? A preliminary investigation. Personality and Individual Differences, 25,233-240.</p>

<p>Crocker, J., Luthertanen, R., Baline, B., & Broadnax, S. (1994). Collective self-esteem and psychological wellbeing among White Black, and Asian College students. Personality and Social Psychological Bulletin, 20, 593 - 513.</p>

<p>DeLazzari, S.A. (2000). Emotional Intelligence, Meaning and Psychological Well being: A comparison between early and late adolescence. Unpublished Thesis.</p>

<p>Donahue, M. (1994). Positive youth development in religiously-based youth programmes. Paper presented at the biennial meetings of the society for Research on Adolescence, San Diego.</p>

<p>Durkheim, E. (1951). Sucide: A study in sociology. Onatario, Toronto: Free Press. </p>

<p>Erickson, E. (1959). Identity and the life cycle. Psychological Issues, 1 ( 1, whole monograph 1)</p>

<p>Freud, S. (1928). The Future of an Illusion. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis.</p>

<p>George, L. K., Ellison, C. G., & Larson, D. B. 2002. Explaining the Relationships between religious involvement and health. Psychological inquiry. 13:190-200.    </p>

<p>Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional Intelligence. New York: Bantam Books. <br />
Greenfield, E. A., & Nadine F. M.,(2007). Raising Social Identity as an Explanatory Factor for Associations between more frequent formal religious participation and psychological well-being. International journal for the psychology of religion.</p>

<p>Hackney, C. H. & Glen. S.S, (2003). Religiosity and Mental Health: A Meta-Analysis of Recent Studies. Journal for the Scientific of Religion 42:43-55.</p>

<p>James, W.,  (1912). The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature Being in Gifford Lectures on Natural Religious Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902. New York: Longmans, Green and Company. <br />
Johnson, L., O’Malley, P. & Bachman, J. (1986): Drug use among American high school students, college students, and other young adults: National trends through 1985. Washington, DC.</p>

<p>Koenig, H.G., & David B. L.. (2001). Religion and Mental Health: Evidence for an Association. International Review of Psychiatry, 13:67-78.</p>

<p>Litchfield, A., Thomas D., & L.B. (1997). Dimensions of religiousity as mediators of the relations between parenting and adolescent deviant behaviour. Journal of Adolescent Research, 12, 199-226.</p>

<p>Marx, K. (1970). Critique of Hegel’s philosophy of Right. Translated by A. Jolin and J.O’ Malley. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.</p>

<p>Maselko, J., & Laura D. K., (2006). “Gender Differences in Religious Practice, Spiritual Experiences and Health: Results from the General Social Survey”. Social Science and Medial 62:2848-2860.</p>

<p>Maslow, A., (1954). Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper Press.</p>

<p>Masse, R., Poulin, C., Dassa, C., Lambert, J., Belair, S., &Battaglini, A. (1998a). Elaboration et validation d’un outil de mesure du bien-etre psychologique: L’emmbep. Canadian Journal of Public Health, 89(5),352-357. </p>

<p>Masse, R., Poulin, C., Dassa, C., Lambert, J., Belair, S., &Battaglini, A. (1998b). The structure of mental health higher-order confirmatory factor analyses of psychological distress and well-being measures. Social Indicators Research,45,475-504.</p>

<p>Mayer, J & Cobb, C. (2000).  Educational policy on emotional intelligence: does it make sense. Educational psychology review, 12(2), 163-183.</p>

<p>Mayer,J., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. (2000). Competing models of emotional intelligence. In Steinberg, R.J.(Ed). Handbook of human intelligence (2nd ed.) New York: Cambridge University Press. </p>

<p>McCulloch, B.J. (1991). Longitudinal investigation of the factor structure of objective wellbeing: The case of the philadelphia Geritric Centre Morale Scale. Journal of Gerontology, 46, 251-158.</p>

<p>Palmer, B. W., Burgess Z., & Stough, C. (2001): Emotional intelligence and effective leadership. Leadership and organizational Development Journal, 22,5-10.</p>

<p>Ryff, C. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations on the meaning of psychological well-being. Journal of personality and social psychology, 57(6), 1069-1081.<br />
   <br />
Salovey, P. & Mayer, J. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination, cognition and personality, 9, 185-211.</p>

<p>Santrock, J. W. (2002). Life Span Development New York: McGraw Hill Higher Education.</p>

<p>Sawatzky, R., Pamela A. R., & Lyren C.. (2005). A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship between Spiritual and Quality of Life. Social Indicators Research 72:153-188.<br />
Schwarzer, R. (1994). Optimism, vulnerability, and self-beliefs as health-related cognitions. A systematic overview. Psychology and Health: An International Journal, 9, 161-180.</p>

<p>Schwarzer, R. & Jerusalem, M. (1995). Generalized self-efficacy scale in J. Weiman, S. Wright & M. Johnston (Ed). Measures in health psychology: A users portfolio causal and control beliefs; pp. 35-37, Winderser, UK NFER-NELSON</p>

<p>Seoffge - Kreake, I. (1995). Stress, coping and relationships in adolescence. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.</p>

<p>Shehan ,C. , L.,( 1984). Wives’ work and psychological well-being: an extension of Gove’s social role theory of depression. Sex Role, 11, 881-899.</p>

<p>Sinha, J.N.P. & Verma, J. (1992). Social support as a moderator of the relationship between allocentrism and psychological well-being. Social and applied issues.</p>

<p>Steinberg, L.D. (2002); Adolescence (6th ed.). The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.</p>

<p>Strawbridge, William J., Sarah J. Shema, Richard D. Cohen, & George A.Kaplan, (2001). Religious Attendance Increases Survival by Improving and Maintaining Good Health Behaviours, Mental Health and Social Relationships. Society of Behavioural Medicine, 23:68-74”.</p>

<p>Wang, C. & Liu, Y. (2000). The relational study on general self-efficacy, trait anxiety, state anxiety and test anxiety. Chinese Journal of Clinical Psychological. 8(4), 229-230.</p>

<p>Weber, M (1958). The protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: C. Scribner’s Press.<br />
Wong, C.S., & Law, K. S. (2002). The effects of leader and follower emotional intelligence on performance and attitude: An exploratory study. The leadership Quarterly, 13, 243-274.<br />
 <br />
Wright, L., Frost, C., & Wisecarver, S. (1993). Church attendance, meaningfulness of religion, and depressive symptomalogy among adolescents. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 22, 559-568.</p>

<p><br />
Correspondence: drdaadeyemo@yahoo.co.uk</p>

<p>**<strong> Dr D.A Adeyemo</strong> holds Doctor of Philosophy in Counselling Psychology.He is currently a Senior Lecturer with the Department of Guidance and Counselling, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. He has published several articles in Local and international  Journals.His area of research interest  is  application of Emotional Intelligence  to enhance career sucess and general well- being.<br />
    *** <strong>Mr A.T Adeleye</strong> holds a Masters Degree in Counselling Psychology with bias for adolescent and youth counselling.He is currently undergoing Doctoral trainning in the Department of Guidance and Counselling, University of Ibadan., Ibadan, Nigeria.<br />
          </p>

<p></p>

<p></p>

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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Workaholism components and perceptions of negative organizational acts(1)</title>
<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://www.ejop.org/archives/2008/02/workaholism_com.html" />
<modified>2008-02-15T22:48:20Z</modified>
<issued>2008-02-14T22:02:35Z</issued>
<id>tag:www.ejop.org,2008://1.151</id>
<created>2008-02-14T22:02:35Z</created>
<summary type="text/plain">Accumulating research findings on work addiction and work addicts has shown that individuals scoring higher on work addiction also report more negative affects and poorer psychological health. This study extends this research by examining the relationship of work addiction to perceptions of negative acts or bullying in a large sample of Norwegian oil rig workers.</summary>
<author>
<name>andreea</name>

<email>psy.journal@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<dc:subject>Research Reports</dc:subject>
<content type="text/html" mode="escaped" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.ejop.org/">
<![CDATA[<p><br />
<strong>Ronald J. Burke Stig B. Matthiesen Stale Einarson and Lisa Fiksenbaum</p>

<p>York University University of Bergen University of Bergen York University</strong></p>

<p><br />
<strong>Summary:</strong> Accumulating research findings on work addiction and work addicts has shown that individuals scoring higher on work addiction also report more negative affects and poorer psychological health. This study extends this research by examining the relationship of work addiction to perceptions of negative acts or bullying in a large sample of Norwegian oil rig workers.</p>

<p>Spence and Robbins (1992), based on an extensive review of the workaholism literature identified and developed measures of three workaholism components; work involvement, feeling driven to work because of internal pressures, and work enjoyment. Profile analysis using these measures were undertaken in  a large sample of social work professors in the US produced three workaholic types and three non-workaholic types based on high or low scores on the three workaholism components. The former were: Work Addicts (WAs), Enthusiastic Addicts (EAs), and Work Enthusiasts (WEs); the latter were: Unengaged Workers (UWs), Relaxed Workers (RWs) and Disenchanted Workers (DWs). Researchers have found that WAs report higher levels of negative affect and poorer psychological health than one or both of the other workaholic types (see Burke, 2000; Burke & Matthisen, 2004; McMillan-O’Driscoll & Burke, 2003, for reviews), and that the Feeling driven component is the most strongly and consistently related with those negative outcomes.</p>

<p>WAs also have more negative work attitudes, more stress at work and more problematic relationships with colleagues (Porter, 1996; 1998;2001). Galperin and Burke (2006), in a study relevant to the present research, considered the relationship of the three Spence and Robbins’ workaholism components and measures of both constructive (e.g., developed creative solutions to problems, best to break the rules to better perform the job) and destructive deviance (e.g., making fun of someone at work) taken property from work without permission. Individuals scored higher on work involvement indicated lower levels of organizational destructive deviance, individuals scoring higher on Work enjoyment second higher on Innovative constructive deviance, while individuals scoring higher on Feeling driven scored lower on Innovative Constructive deviance.</p>

<p>This study considers the relationship of workaholism components with perceptions of negative organizational acts or bullying in the workplace. Workplace bullying has received significant attention during the past decade particularly in Scandinavia and the UK. Salin (2003a) defines bullying as “repeated and persistent negative acts towards one or more individual(s), which involve a perceived power imbalance ad create a hostile work environment” (pp. 1214-1215). She develops a model of organizational antecedents of bullying  classifying structures and processes into three groups: enabling structures or necessary antecedents (e.g., low perceived costs, dissatisfaction and frustration), motivating structures or incentives (e.g., internal competition, reward systems and expected benefits) and precipitating processes or triggering circumstances (e.g., organizational crises, other organizational changes). Sales (2003b) argues that workplace bullying can also be a form of organizational politics. She reported a correlation between a politicized and competitive climate and bullying. Thus her description of the structures and processes that precipitate, enable and motivate bullying resemble those that support workaholism (Burke, 2000; Killinger, 1991; Robinson, 1998; Schaef & Fausel, 1988; Fasell; 1990). Thus the general hypothesis underlying this research proposes relationships between the workaholism components, particularly Feeling driven to work because of inner pressures, and perceived negative acts or bullying behaviors.</p>

<p><br />
<strong>Method</strong></p>

<p><br />
P<strong>rocedure</strong></p>

<p><br />
Data were collected from Norwegian oil rig workers using an anonymous questionnaire. Questionnaires were distributed by mail to 1800 randomly selected offshore workers representing various companies and installations. All were members of either NOPEF (Norsk Olje-og Petrokjemisk Fagforbund) or OFS (Oljearbeidernes Fellessammenslutning ) – later renamed SAFE (Sammenslutingen Av Fagorgoniserte: Energisektoren), the major unions for offshore workers in Norway. A total of 1017 individuals returned completed questionnaires to the research team in pre-stamped envelopes that were provided, a 59% response rate.</p>

<p>Respondents</p>

<p>Most respondents were male (86%), between 35 and 55 years of age (70%), were about equally represented by the two unions, were employed by the installation operator (54%), had non-supervisory jobs (71%), had long offshore and platform tenure (66% had 11 or more years of offshore tenure and 52% had 6 or more years of platform tenure), most worked 100% offshore (95%), were permanent employees (86%), worked the same work schedule - 2 weeks on and 3-4 weeks off (93%), and worked in Maintenance, Drilling or Catering (26%, 19% and 16%, respectively).</p>

<p><br />
<strong>Measures</strong></p>

<p><br />
Workaholism Components</p>

<p>Three workaholism components proposed by Spence and Robbins (1992) were measured by scales they developed. Work Involvement was measured by seven items (α = .56). One item was “I like to use my time constructively, both on and off the job”. Feeling driven to work was assessed by an eight item scale (α =.82). An item was “I seem to have an inner compulsion to work hard, a feeling that it’s something I have to do whether I want to or not”. Joy in work was measured by seven items (α = .81). One item was “Most of the time my work is very pleasurable”. Respondents indicated their agreement on a five point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 5 = Strongly agree).</p>

<p>Negative Acts</p>

<p>The Negative Acts Questionnaire developed by Einarsen, Rakner, Matthiesen and Hellesoy, 1994) examined how frequently individuals had experienced negative acts in the workplace on a five point scale (1 = Never, 3 = mostly, 5 = daily). The scale had 22 items (α =.91). Sample items were: “being ridiculed or humiliated in connection with your work”, “being shouted at or being the target of spontaneous anger”, and “spreading of gossip or rumours about you”.</p>

<p><br />
<strong>Results</strong></p>

<p><br />
Comparing Workaholism Types</p>

<p>The top half of Table 1 shows the comparisons of the six workaholic types on the measure of perceived negative acts or bullying. WAs reported significantly more negative acts than did WEs, UWs, and RWs; DWs also reported more negative acts than did WEs, UWs, and RWs.</p>

<p><br />
Table 1<br />
Workaholism Components and Negative Acts</p>

<p>Workaholism Types                      Workaholic Types	                                          <br />
<img alt="workoholism.jpg" src="http://www.ejop.org/workoholism.jpg" width="423" height="336" /></p>

<p>The bottom half of Table 1 presents the results of a hierarchical regression analysis in which perceptions of negative acts were regressed on three blocks of predictors entered in a specified order. The first block consisted of personal demographics (e.g., age, sex, marital and parental status). The second block consisted of work situation characteristics (e.g., years of off-shore experience, unit size); the third block of predictors consisted of the three workaholism components. When a block of predictors accounted for a significant amount or increment in explained variance or perception of negative acts (p<.05), individual measures within these blocks having independent and significant relationships with the dependent variable were identified (p < .05). Only one block of  predictors accounted for a significant amount or increment in explained variance (Workaholism components); oil rig workers scoring higher on Feeling driven reported more negative acts or bullying.</p>

<p><br />
Discussion<strong><br />
</strong></p>

<p><br />
These findings extend our understanding of the work experiences of WAs and the key role played by Feeling driven to work because of inner pressures in predicting these experiences. As hypothesized, WAs reported a more hostile, bullying and toxic work environment.<br />
These results offer another possible explanation for the lower levels of job and career satisfaction of WAs noted by others (see Burke, 2000; McMillan, O’Driscoll & Burke, 2003, for reviews).<br />
 <br />
<strong>Footnotes</strong></p>

<p><br />
(1) Preparation of this manuscript was supported in part by York University, and the Department of Psychology, University of Bergen. We thank the two unions that participated in the data collection. Louise Coutu prepared the manuscript.</p>

<p><br />
<strong>References</strong></p>

<p></p>

<p>Burke, R.J. & Matthiesen, S.B. (2004) Workaholism among Norwegian journalists: Antecedents and consequences. Stress and Health, 20, 301-308.</p>

<p>Burke, R.J. (2000) Workaholism in organizations: Concepts, results and future research directions. International Journal of Management Research, 1, 1-19.</p>

<p>Einarson, S., Raknes, B.I., Matthiesen, S.B. & Hellosoy,   (1994) Bullying and personified conflicts: Health endangering interactions at work. Bergen, Norway: Sigma Forlag.</p>

<p>Fassel, D. (1990) Working ourselves to death: the high costs of workaholism the rewards of recovery. San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins.</p>

<p>Galperin, B.L., & Burke, R.J. (2006) Uncovering the relationship between workaholism and workplace deviance: An exploratory study. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 17, 1-17.</p>

<p>Killinger, B. (1991) Workaholics: the respectable addicts. New York: Simon & Schuster.</p>

<p><br />
McMillan, L.H.W., O’Driscoll, M.P., & Burke, R.J., (2003) Workaholism: A review of theory, research and new directions. In C.L. Cooper & I.T. Robertson (eds) International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. New York: John Wiley. Pp. 167-190.</p>

<p>Porter, G. (1996) Organizational impact of workaholism: Suggestions for researching the negative outcomes of excessive work.  Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 1, 70-84.</p>

<p>Porter, G. (1998) Can y ou trust a workaholic? How work addiction erodes trust throughout the organization. Journal of Contemporary Business Issues, 6, 48-57.</p>

<p>Porter, G. (2001) Workaholic tendencies and the high potential for stress among co-workers. International Journal